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I. INTRODUCTION'

Courts have long struggled with whether and to what extent for
transfer tax purposes the value of gratuitously transferred shares in
closely-held C corporations 2 should be discounted to reflect the potential
* Associate, Withers Bergman, LLP. The author would like to thank Dennis Calfee,
Stephen Lind, Martin McMahon, and David Richardson for their extensive and insightful comments
on drafts of this article. Any errors and omissions are the author's.
1. Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations are to the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") of 1986, as amended, and to the Treasury Regulations thereunder, as amended.
2. A C corporation is a corporation as defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) that has not made an
election under I.R.C. § 1362(a) to be treated as an S corporation. See I.R.C. § 1361(a). A
corporation is closely-held when its stock is owned by a relatively few number of shareholders,
many of whom are often related parties.
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tax liability that a corporation would incur from the recognition of builtin gain' in its underlying assets. This discount is known as the built-in
gain discount. In the most recent appellate decision on the issue, Estate
of Jelke v. Commissioner,4 the estate argued that the value of the C
corporation stock included in the decedent's gross estate should be
discounted by the full amount of any built-in gain tax liability. 5 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the estate. 6 It
granted a "dollar-for-dollar discount" by reducing the corporation's fair
market value by the entire amount of tax liability that would be incurred
if the corporation sold the underlying assets on the valuation date. 7 In so
doing, the Eleventh Circuit relied on two cases from the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner8 and
Estate of Dunn v. Commissioner.9 As explained below, Estate of Dunn
and Estate of Jelke present problematic rulings that future courts should
decline to follow.' 0
This article considers whether and to what extent courts should
permit a built-in gain discount. It begins by presenting the challenges of
valuing assets for transfer tax purposes, discussing the general principles
of transfer tax valuation, and highlighting the particular methodologies
used to value closely-held entities. The article then examines how,

3. Built-in gain is a taxpayer's unrealized appreciation in property. It is the I.R.C. § 1001(a)
gain realized that a taxpayer would incur on a hypothetical sale of the property, calculated by using
as the I.R.C. § 1001(b) amount realized the property's fair market value and as the I.R.C. § 101 (a)
adjusted basis the taxpayer's actual basis, both determined as of the date of the hypothetical sale.
For the discussion that follows, the character of the built-in gain would generally be capital gain.
See I.R.C. § 1221. However, where the gain is triggered at the corporate level, the preferential
I.R.C § 1(h) capital gains rates would not apply. Accordingly, as it relates to corporate level gain,
the distinction between capital gain and ordinary gain is ignored unless otherwise stated.
4. Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317 (lth Cir. 2007), rev'g, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397
(2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008). See infra text § III.C. Shortly after the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari on the Estate of Jelke appeal, Judge Swift of the Tax Court issued his
opinion in Estate ofLitchfield v. Commissioner, which concerned the amount of the built-in gain
discount in a closely-held C corporation and a closely-held S corporation. 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079
(2009). See infra note 245.
5. Estate of Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1319.
6. Id. at 1333.
7. Id. at 1320, 1333.
8. Estate of Jameson v. Comm'r, 267 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'g, 77 T.C.M. (CCH)
1383 (1999). See infra text § III.C.
9. Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'g, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337
(2000). See infra text § III.C.
10. See infra text §§ III and IV.
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during the era of the General Utilities doctrine," a prospective
liquidation test, which considered the prospect and affect of liquidation,
led courts to repeatedly disallow the built-in gain discount. However,
since the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, the prospective
liquidation test has been discarded, at least in part, and courts have
become receptive to allowing the discount. The article considers the
current debate, which the Supreme Court has declined to resolve, 2 and
analyzes the holdings in three prominent court of appeals cases, 3 the
Tax Court opinions these cases overruled,' 4 and the parties' underlying
arguments. The article demonstrates that the decisions in Estate of Dunn
and Estate ofJelke relied on a problematic assumption-namely, that the
corporation being valued is deemed liquidated on the valuation date. 5
The article exposes that this assumption may lead to inaccurate
outcomes in future cases. To avoid such results, the article proposes a
modified liquidation test, which would yield a more accurate calculation
of the built-in gain discount.
II. TRANSFER TAX VALUATION OF CLOSELY-HELD ENTITIES
Accurate valuation of gratuitously transferred assets is critical to
the implementation of the transfer tax regime.' 6 Each transfer tax uses
the value of the transferred property as the base upon which the tax is
calculated.17 This value is determined as of the relevant valuation date,

11. See Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), supersededby statute,
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v.
Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998).
12. Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), rev'g, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397
(2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).
13. Id. at 1317; Estate of Dunn, 301 F.3d at 339; Estate of Jameson, 267 F.3d at 366. There is
also a fourth relevant, though unpublished, opinion. See Estate of Welch v. Comm'r, No. 98-2007,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (discussed infra notes 156
and 188).
14. Estate ofJelke v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397 (2005); Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 79
T.C.M. (CCH) 1337 (2000); Estate of Jameson v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383 (1999).
15. Estate ofJelke, 507 F.3d at 1331; Estate of Dunn, 301 F.3d at 353.
16. The transfer tax regime consists of the estate tax, the gift tax, and the generation-skipping
transfer ("GST") tax. See Subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code: Chapter 11 (estate tax), Chapter
12 (gift tax), and Chapter 13 (generation-skipping transfer tax). Chapter 14, also a part of the
transfer tax regime, provides special rules on valuation that are not relevant to the present
discussion; Chapter 15, also a part of the transfer tax regime, imposes a transfer tax on covered gifts
and bequests from U.S. expatriates.
17. See I.R.C. § 203 1(a) (including in gross estate the value of decedent's property); I.R.C. §
2512(a) (stating amount of gift is the value of the transferred property); I.R.C. §§ 2621 - 2623
(subjecting to GST tax the value of property received by the transferee); see also RICHARD B.
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which is generally the date of the transfer.' 8 Because lower valuation
results in less transfer tax liability, taxpayers often seek to minimize the
value of gratuitously transferred property.' 9 The value of the transferred
property is a function of two determinations. First, the undiscounted fair
market value of the transferred property must be ascertained. Second, a
decision must be made as to whether the undiscounted fair market value
should be reduced by any valuation discounts, and, if so, the amount of
those discounts.
To determine the undiscounted fair market value, transfer tax
valuation begins with fundamental rules. Fair market value is "the price
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. 2 ° This willing
buyer-willing seller test is well established, 2 1 and its facets and
implications have been widely developed in case law.22
Three important characteristics of the willing buyer-willing seller
test are evident from the Regulations. First, fair market value arises
from the willingness between a hypothetical willing buyer (the "HWB")
and a hypothetical willing seller (the "HWS") (collectively, the
"hypothetical parties") to enter into the transaction. The willing
exchange contemplates a market bargain where the HWS is free to make
known the availability of the goods and the HWB is able to shop for the

STEPHENS, ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION 14.05[1], at 14-12 to 14-15 (8th abr. ed.
2008) (discussing methods of GST tax valuation).
18. See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (valuing gross estate as of decedent's date of death); I.R.C. § 2512(a)
(valuing gift at time of transfer); I.R.C § 2624(a) (valuing GST at time of transfer); but see I.R.C §§
2032 and 2032A (permitting alternative valuation dates for estate tax); I.R.C. § 2624(b) and (c)
(permitting alternative valuation dates for GST tax).
19. Undervaluation penalties are designed to corral figures within an acceptable range. See
I.R.C. § 6662. Alternatively, taxpayers might have an incentive to overvalue assets. If the
decedent's gross estate is worth less than the I.R.C. § 2010(c) applicable exclusion amount, then
the decedent's estate has an incentive to inflate the value of property, up to the applicable exclusion
amount, so that the heirs and beneficiaries will receive a higher I.R.C. § 1014 basis, thereby
diminishing future gain or increasing future loss. Note that the I.R.C. § 2010(c) sunset provisions
and I.R.C. § 1022 may alter these incentives.
20. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1 (b) and 25.2512-1; accord United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S.
546, 551 (1973); Estate of Cook v. Comm'r, 349 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 2003); Comm'r v.
Stewart's Estate, 153 F.2d 17, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1946); Snyder v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 529, 539 (1989);
Estate of Hall v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 312, 335 (1989). The same test applies to GST valuation.
ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17.
21. See JOHN A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION 2.01[l], 2-3 to 2-5 (2003 Cum.
Supp.) (noting that the willing buyer-willing seller test is nearly as old as the estate tax).
22. See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
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lowest price.23 Neither is under compulsion, and both are free to buy
and sell as they please.2 4 Consequently, a forced liquidation or fire sale
scenario is not an appropriate basis for valuation, as it is premised on a
compulsion to sell that negates the willing exchange assumption. 25 To
the contrary, the hypothetical transaction must be presumed to occur
under prevailing market conditions in the ordinary course of business.26
Second, the HWB and HWS are hypothetical market participants.27
The value they place on property is independent from any emotions
actual parties might possess.28 The hypothetical parties have general
characteristics, not the characteristics of actual buyers and sellers; 29 they
are strangers with no familial connections. 30
Furthermore, the
hypothetical parties are neither pessimists nor optimists. 3 1 Most
importantly, they are rational actors who seek to maximize their own
economic advantage. 32 Courts will assume that the hypothetical parties
make rational decisions to advance their financial positions to the
greatest extent possible; to this end, courts may not assume transactions
33
that are contrary to the hypothetical parties' economic interests.

23. Comm'r v. Stewart's Estate, 153 F.2d 17, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1946); Helvering v. Warbridge,
70 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir. 1934).
24. VALUATION, supranote 21, 2.01 [2][b][i], at 2-9 to 2-11.
25. See id.
26. Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1432-33 (7th Cir. 1983); Estate of
Newhouse v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 193, 218 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1321 n.1 1(11th Cir. 2007), rev'g, 89
T.C.M. (CCH) 1397 (2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d
1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1981); Estate of Newhouse, 94 T.C. at 218; Borgatello v. Comm'r, 80
T.C.M. (CCH) 260, 264 (2000).
28. See, e.g., Meaker Co. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 1348, 1354-55 (1951); Whittemore v.
Fitzpatrick, 127 F.Supp. 710, 715-16 (D. Conn 1954); see also VALUATION supra note 21,
2.01[2][c][ii], at 2-23 to 2-28; but see Estate of Palmer v. Comm'r, 839 F.2d 420, 423-24 (8th Cir.
1988), rev'g, 86 T.C. 66 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Estate of Curry, 706 F.2d at 1428, 1431; Estate of Bright v. Comm'r, 658 F.2d
999, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1981); Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 530, 535 (1998); Estate of
Newhouse, 94 T.C. at 218.
30. VALUATION, supra note 21, IM 2.01[2][c][iii], at 2-28 to 2-45, 4.03[4], at 4-63 to 4-90,
5.01[2][d], at 5-16 to 5-18.
31. Compare Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, 1340 (2000) (noting actual
shareholders' optimism concerning future returns), rev'd on other grounds, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir.
2002), with id. at 1345 (recognizing that HWB may have incentive to liquidate).
32. See, e.g., Estate of Watts v. Comm'r, 823 F.2d 483, 486 (11th Cir. 1987); Estate of Curry,
706 F.2d at 1428; Propstra,680 F.2d at 1251-52; Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1005-06; Estate of
Newhouse, 94 T.C. at 218; Estate of Simplot v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 130, 152 (1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 249 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001); Estate ofBorgatello,80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 264.
33. Estate of Curry, 706 F.2d at 1428-29.
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Third, the hypothetical parties have knowledge of all relevant
facts.34 This means that on the valuation date, they have knowledge of
the relevant facts and circumstances existing at that time. The
hypothetical parties are not clairvoyant, however, and future events may
be considered only if they were reasonably foreseeable on the valuation
date. 35 This third characteristic is related to the first two. For the
hypothetical parties to transact in a willing manner commensurate with
market bargaining, they must be equipped with the proper foundation for
making informed decisions. Accordingly, they are deemed to have the
most reliable and accurate information that a reasonable and intelligent
investigation would reveal.36 This knowledge also arises from a
hypothetical vantage point. All relevant knowledge is imputed to the
hypothetical parties, even if actual parties lack such information.37
With these characteristics about the hypothetical parties in place,
the next step is to determine the market from which the price will be
derived. Where there is only one market with readily ascertainable
prices, valuation can be straightforward.38 Where multiple markets
exist, the task becomes more challenging because valuation may rest on
39
whether the hypothetical sale occurs in a wholesale or retail market.
Although market prices for many types of property are readily available,
clear market prices do not exist for all property. Certain types of
property are difficult to value because they lack a market in which they
are commonly exchanged.
And so it is that calculating the built-in gain discount presents such
a challenge 40 -shares in closely-held corporations are a paradigm
example of property for which no market exists. 41 Where there is no
market, an arm's length sale that has occurred near the time of valuation

34. See Comm'r. v. Stewart's Estate, 153 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1946); McShain v. Comm'r, 71
T.C. 998, 1004 (1979) (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 422 (1975)).
35. See Estate of Simplot, 112 T.C. at 152; Estate of Newhouse, 93 T.C. at 218; Estate of
Gilford v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 38, 52 (1987); Messing v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 502, 509 (1967) (the
successful public sale of stock two weeks after it was gifted did not decide the stock's value given
the "vagaries of the stock market").
36. VALUATION, supra note 21, 2.01[3][a][i], at 2-47 to 2-49.
37. Id. 2.01[3][a][ii], at 2-53 to 2-54.
38. For example, valuation of publicly traded stocks and bonds is based on the mean of the
highest and lowest quoted selling prices on the valuation date. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(b)(1) and
25.2512-2(b)(1).
39. VALUATION, supranote 21, 2.01[4][b], at 2-81 to 2-97.
40. See infra text §§ III and IV.
41. See VALUATION, supra note 21, 2.01[5][c][i], at 2-104 to 2-109; ESTATE AND GIFT,
supra note 17, 4.02[3][f], at 4-26 to 4-28.
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can aid in calculating the value,42 but this is rarely the case. In the more
likely scenario where no sale has recently occurred, regulations provide
guidance.43 If selling prices, bid prices, and ask prices are unavailable,
the fair market value of stock may be determined by considering "the
company's net worth, prospective earning power and dividend-paying
capacity, and other relevant factors. '4 4 In Revenue Ruling 59-60,45 the
IRS also stressed the following factors:
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its
inception.
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of
the specific industry in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the
business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity.
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible
value.
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued.
(h) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a
similar line of business having their stocks actively traded in a free and
open market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter.46
Despite this guidance, none of the factors in the regulation or
revenue ruling is controlling.47 Courts have repeatedly stated that
determining the factors' relative weights depends upon the facts and

42. Champion v. Comm'r, 303 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1962); Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 110
T.C. 530, 536 (1998); Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 101 (1986); Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79
T.C. 938, 940 (1982), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631,
100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998); Duncan
Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 266,276 (1979).
43. See also I.R.C. § 2031(b) (stating that valuation of unlisted stock and securities may be
determined by comparison to other corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of business).
44. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0. Other relevant factors include:
[t]he good will of the business; the economic outlook in the particular industry; the
company's position in the industry and its management; the degree of control of the
business represented by the block of stock to be valued; and the values of securities of
corporations engaged in the same or similar lines of business which [sic.] are listed on a
stock exchange.
Id (flush
45.
46.
47.

language).
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
Id. at 238-39.
Id.at 238.
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circumstances of each case.4 8 Thus, the value of transferred property is a
question of fact. 49 Nonetheless, proper valuation methodology is a
question of law, 50 and courts rely on three approaches to value closelyheld entities: the income approach, the market approach, and the net
asset value approach. 1
Under the income approach, an entity's value is determined by
discounting to present value the stream of income it is expected to
produce. The aggregate present value of future income determines the
entity's value. 3 The entity's past earnings are used as the proxy for
future earnings; 54 more recent earnings are considered a more accurate
prediction of future income and are weighted accordingly. 5
The
discounted income stream is typically calculated based upon future net
income, which means the aggregated value is net of future corporate
income taxes. 6 Because this approach looks to future income, it is
applied to entities actively engaged in the production of income, usually
through the sale of products or services. 7
48. See, e.g., Estate ofJelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1321 n. 12 (1lth Cir. 2007), rev'g, 89
T.C.M. (CCH) 1397 (2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008); Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50,
53 n.9 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Goodall v. Comm'r, 391 F.2d 775, 786 (8th Cir. 1968); Estate of
Davis v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 530, 536-37 (1998); Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 367, 376
(1973); Roschuni v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 1193, 1201-02 (1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1959);
Estate of Gray v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1940, 1945 (1997).
49. See, e.g., Hamem v. Comm'r, 325 F.2d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of Jung v.
Comm'r, 101 T.C. 412, 423-24 (1993); Estate ofNewhouse v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 193, 217 (1990);
Estate of Jephson v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 297, 303 (1986); Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938,
940 (1982), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat.
2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Deputy
v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1497, 1500 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Powers v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 259, 260 (1941); Estate ofJelke, 507 F.3d at 1321;
Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339, 348 (5th Cir. 2002); Adams v. United States, 218 F.3d
383, 386 (5th Cir. 2000); In re T.H. New Orleans, Ltd. P'ship, 116 F.3d 790, 799 (5th Cir. 1997).
51. ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17, 4.02[2][b], at 4-15 to 4-17; see also Estate of Jelke v.
Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 1402 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.
2007); Estate of Kelley v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369, 371 (2005); Estate of Borgatello v.
Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 260, 266 (2000).
52. VALUATION, supra note 21, 7 3.05[1][a], at 3-49 to 3-51; ESTATE & GIFT, supranote 17,
4.02[2][b][i], at 4-16; Estate of Jelke, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1402; Estate of Kelley, 90 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 371.
53. VALUATION, supra note 21, 3.05[1][a], 3-49 to 3-51; ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17, 7
4.02[2][b][i], at 4-16.
54. VALUATION, supra note 21, 3.05[4][d], at 3-64 to 3-69; ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17,
4.02[2][b][i], at 4-16.
55. VALUATION, supra note 21, 3.05[4][d][iv], at 3-68 to 3-69; ESTATE & GIFT, supra note
17, 4.02[2][b][i], at 4-16.
56. VALUATION, supranote 21, 1 3.05[4][a], at 3-61 to 3-62 and 6.03[6][b], at 6-48 to 6-50.
57. Estate of Ford v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507, 1511 (1993), aff'd, 53 F.3d 924 (8th
Cir. 1995).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol24/iss1/5

8

Bowman: Built-in Gain Discounts for Transfer Tax Valuation: A Resolution
2009]

BUILT-IN GAIN DISCOUNTS FOR TRANSFER TAX VALUATION

The market approach determines an entity's value by comparing the
entity to similar entities with more readily ascertainable values.58 In
essence, valuation is determined by relying on the value of comparable
entities.59 Comparison with publicly traded entities is preferred, as the
value of such entities can be determined from prevailing market prices.60
However, comparable sales may also be derived from the private
market.6 ' Once the comparable sales price is determined, it must be
adjusted to reflect differences between the comparable entity and the
entity being valued. 62 The market approach can be of limited use, as it is
appropriate only where comparable entities are similar enough to the
entity being valued. Where variations between the comparable entity
and the entity being valued are too great to be remedied by adjustment,
this method is typically avoided.63
Finally, under the net asset value approach, an entity's value is
determined by subtracting its liabilities from the fair market value of its
underlying assets.64 Thus, the aggregate net asset value of an entity's
assets determines the entity's value. The net asset value approach is
applied to entities without an active business, such as holding entities or
entities engaged in investment activities. 65 These entities typically
produce relatively little income compared to the fair market value of the
underlying assets, making these entities particularly amenable to this

58. VALUATION, supra note 21, 3.04[1], at 3-23 to 3-27; ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17, at I
4.02[2][b][ii], at 4-16; Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 1402 (2005), rev'd on
other grounds, 507 F.3d 1317 (11 th Cir. 2007); Estate of Kelley v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369,
371 (2005).
59. VALUATION, supra note 21, 1 3.04[1], at 3-23 to 3-27.
60. Id.; ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17, 4.02[2][b][ii], at 4-16.
61. See VALUATION, supra note 21, 3.04[3][c], at 3-39 to 3-43.
62. VALUATION, supra note 21, 3.04[2][c], at 3-30 to 3-35; ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17,
4.02[2][b][ii], at 4-16.
63. VALUATION, supra note 21, 3.04[3][c], at 3-39 to 3-43.
64. VALUATION, supra note 20, 3.04[1], at 3-23 to 3-27; ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17,
4.02[2][b][iii], at 4-17; Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 52 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Andrews v.
Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 459, 463 (1976)); Estate of Kelley v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369,
371 (2005); Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 1402 (2005); Estate ofAndrews, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) at 463. This approach is similar to a cost method of valuation, under which the value
of the entity is determined by calculating the cost of acquiring its underlying assets. See
VALUATION, supra note 21, 13.06, at 3-79 to 3-96.
65. ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17, 4.02[2][b][iii], at 4-17; Estate of Piper v. Comm'r, 72
T.C. 1062, 1071-72 (1979), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514 § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d
Cir. 1998); Estate of Borgatello v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 260, 266 (2000); Estate of Ford v.
Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507, 1511 (1993), af'd,53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995); Estate of Jephson
v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 297, 303-04 (1986).
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type of valuation.66 Moreover, even where minimal business activity is
involved, the net asset value approach may still be appropriate and
preferred.6 7 An important assumption about the net asset value approach
is that the HWB purchases the entity to obtain ownership of the entity's
underlying assets. 68 This assumption holds true because the value of the
entity is not determined from the entity's income producing capacity;
instead, the entity's assets provide the value. 69
However, this
assumption does not imply that the HWB purchases the entity with the
objective of immediately converting the assets into cash.7 °
Not all entities are amenable to valuation by just one approach.
Some entities will have both operating and investment components;
comparable sales might reflect some components of an entity yet be
inapposite to others. 7' In such cases, courts permit a combination of the
approaches to value the entity's respective components.72 Under this
hybrid approach, courts will rely on expert testimony to value the
components. 73 If the components can be easily segregated, the
components can be independently valued; where the components are
intertwined, expert testimony will determine the weight to be placed on
the respective components.74

66. Estate of Borgatello, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 266; See also ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17,
4.02[2][b][iii], at 4-17.
67. See Estate of Lee v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 860, 869-70 (1978); Estate of Ford, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1517.
68. See Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339, 353 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of Cruikshank v.
Comm'r, 9 T.C. 162, 165 (1947), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514 § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir.
1998).
69. Estate of Borgatello, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 266; See Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 102
(1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-514, §
631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998).
70. Ward, 87 T.C. at 104; Estate of Cruikshank, 9 T.C. at 165. As discussed infra note 313
and accompanying text, this is an essential point as it relates to determining the built-in gain
discount. Simply stated, the HWB has the choice of either holding the underlying assets or
converting the assets to cash. The HWB should be presumed to take the more economically
beneficial course of action, which may or may not be conversion to cash.
71. See Estate of Dunn v. Comm 'r, 301 F.3d at 350.
72. ESTATE & GiFT, supra note 17,
4.02[2][b][iv], at 4-17; See Estate of Andrews v.
Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938, 944 (1982), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tax Reform Act § 631,
as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Ford, 66
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1520; Estate of Gallun v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1316, 1320 (1974),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-514, § 631, 100
Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Thalheimer
v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 877, 908-11 (1974).
73. See Estate of Ford,66 T.C.M. at 1520-22; Estate of Thalheimer,33 T.C.M. at 911.
74. See Estate of Ford,66 T.C.M. at 1522; Estate of Thalheimer, 33 T.C.M. at 911.
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Once the undiscounted fair market value of the transferred property
is determined, courts consider whether any valuation discounts are
appropriate. 75 The discounts that are most frequently applied to closelyheld entities are for a lack of control and for a lack of marketability. The
lack of control discount is available where the valued interest entails
insufficient voting control to effectuate liquidation or to dictate the
entity's courses of action.76 Thus, a lack of control discount is typically
applied to nonvoting or minority interests.77 The lack of marketability
discount is applied in circumstances where there is a limited market in
which the asset can be sold or where there are restrictions on transferring
Several considerations that may factor into the
the interest. 78
computation of the lack of marketability discount include any applicable
securities regulations, 79 a lack of public awareness concerning the valued
asset, 80 and risk associated with the investment. 81 As discussed below,
the built-in gain discount should be applied as a subsidiary component in
the lack of marketability discount.8 2
These basic valuation principles form the foundation for decisions
addressing the built-in gain discount. At issue in these cases is valuation
under the net asset value approach of closely-held C corporations, where
the fair market value of a corporation's underlying assets exceeds its
basis in the assets. The question then becomes how a HWB valuing a
corporation under the net asset value approach would account for the
built-in gain. Although this determination is shaped by the imputed
characteristics of the HWB, it is also inextricably tied to the treatment
subchapter C dictates for corporate distributions and liquidations.

75. See, e.g., Estate of Gallun, 33 T.C.M. at 1320; Estate of Thalheimer, 33 T.C.M. at 911.
76. See ESTATE & GIFT, supra note 17, 4.02[4][c][i], at 4-38.
77. See VALUATION, supranote 21, 4.03[l][a], at 4-26 to 4-28.
78. See ESTATE & GIFT, supranote 17, at 4.0214][d][i], at 4-40.
79. JOHN A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION 4.04[l][a][i] (2008 Supp.). Under
federal and state law, unregistered securities, such as interests in closely-held entities, can be sold
only in limited markets. Id.
80. Id. at 4.04[l][a][ii]. Where the public lacks knowledge of the availability of the valued
asset, there will be fewer interested buyers and a correspondingly lower demand.
81. Id. at 4.04[l][a][iii].
82. See infra text §IV.C.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUILT-IN GAIN DISCOUNT
A. Built-in Gain Discounts under the General UtilitiesDoctrine
When litigation first began on the issue of the built-in gain
discount, C corporations reaped the benefits of an era governed by the
General Utilities doctrine. Stated generally, the General Utilities
doctrine provided corporations nonrecognition of gain or loss on
distributions of corporate property to shareholders with respect to their
stock.8 ' The doctrine came from the Supreme Court's decision in
4 The General Utilities
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering.8
and Operating Company ("General Utilities") received an offer for the
purchase of its shares in the Islands Edison Company.85 Rather than
selling the shares directly, General Utilities distributed the Islands
Edison stock as a dividend to its shareholders,86 and the shareholders
subsequently sold their shares to the offering buyer.87 The Court held
that because the distribution did not constitute a sale and the shares were
not used to discharge indebtedness, 8 8 General Utilities recognized no
gain on the transaction. 89 Although judicial decisions and statutory
amendments would eventually erode the General Utilities doctrine, 90 the

83.

See

BORIS

BIrrKER

&

JAMES

S.

EuSTICE,

FEDERAL

INCOME

TAXATION

OF

8.20[3], 8-72 to 8-73 (7th ed. Supp. 2008); Louis F.
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
Lobenhofer, The Repeal of General Utilities [Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200] for
CorporateLiquidations: The Consequences of Incomplete and Unexpected Tax Reform, 4 AKRON
TAX J. 153, 153 (1987); Eric S. Shube, CorporateIncome or Loss on Distributionsof Property:An
Analysis of General Utilities, 12 J. CORP. TAX'N 3 (1985). The shareholders would take a fair
market value basis in the property received, thereby eliminating the built-in gain. See Lobenhofer,
supra, at 153-54.
84. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), superseded by statute,
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), as recognized in
Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998). The doctrine arguably predated the
decision in General Utilities. See BrrTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 83, 8.20[2], at 8-70 to 8-71;
Shube, supranote 83, at 9; First Sav. Bank of Ogden v. Burnet, 53 F.2d 919, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
85. Gen. Utils., 296 U.S. at 201-02.
86. Id. at 202-03.
87. Id. at 203.
88. There was some debate as to whether General Utilities had declared a cash dividend.
Where a dividend was declared that could be satisfied only in cash, then a distribution in kind was
treated as a payment in relief of indebtedness. Such a transaction would have required gain
recognition. See id. at 204; Shube, supranote 83, at 11-13.
89. Gen. Utils., 296 U.S. at 206.
90. See BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 83, 8.20[3], 8-72 to 8-73; Lobenhofer, supra note
83, at 155-59; Shube, supra note 83, at 27-37 (summarizing statutory limitations on the General
Utilities rule).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol24/iss1/5

12

Bowman: Built-in Gain Discounts for Transfer Tax Valuation: A Resolution
2009]

BUILT-IN GAIN DISCOUNTS FOR TRANSFER TAx VALUATION

doctrine won Congressional approval in the 1954 Code. 91 The
nonrecognition principle was incorporated into subchapter C, with
former § 311 (1954) governing nonliquidating distributions and former
§§ 336 and 337 (1954) governing liquidating distributions.92
While the General Utilities doctrine was alive and well, the
nonrecognition afforded to liquidating and nonliquidating distributions
shaped the transfer tax treatment of built-in gains in closely-held C
corporations. Beginning with Estate of Cruikshank v. Commissioner,93
the Tax Court consistently disallowed a built-in gain discount. 94 In
Estate of Cruikshank, the Tax Court considered the estate tax valuation
of the decedent's shares in Cruikshank Investment Co., a closely-held C
corporation that served as a holding company for cash, stocks, bonds,
and real estate. 95 These underlying assets had appreciated since their
purchase, resulting in built-in gain.96 The court considered the propriety
of discounting the decedent's shares to reflect the potential tax liability
that would be incurred upon the sale of the underlying assets. 97 Without
further reasoning, the court determined no discount should be allowed
and suppositious liability for taxes on sales not made
for "hypothetical
98
nor projected."
After the 1954 integration of the General Utilities doctrine into the
Code, the Tax Court continued to follow Estate of Cruikshank and more
clearly articulated the standard for determining the availability of the
discount. What developed was a prospective liquidation test. First,
courts considered whether at the time of the transfer the corporation had

91. Lobenhofer, supranote 83, at 158; Shube, supra note 83, at 3.
92. See Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 311, 336-37, 68A Stat. 3.
93. Estate of Cruikshank v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 162 (1947), superseded by statute, Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), as recognized in Eisenberg v.
Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998). Cruikshank is often cited as the first major case on the
issue. But see also Richardson v. Comm'r, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945); Estate of Huntington v.
Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 698 (1937).
94. It is interesting to note that prior to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, federal
district courts decided the only two cases allowing the built-in gain discount. See Clark v. United
States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6417, 75-6419-20 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (holding, without citation to authority,
that sale of closely-held company's underlying investment portfolio would result in capital gains
tax, and that a willing buyer would take such tax into account in valuing the company's shares);
Obermer v. United States, 238 F.Supp. 29, 35-36 (D. Haw. 1964) (allowing some discount for builtin gains on account of strong and convincing expert testimony not proffered in Cruikshank). The
Tax Court, however, consistently denied the discount. See infra notes 101-122 and accompanying
text.
95. Estate ofCruikshank,9 T.C. at 162-63.
96. Id. at 164.
97. Id. at 165.
98. Id.
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plans to liquidate the underlying assets. 99 Second, courts determined
whether a future liquidation of the corporation could be performed
without triggering tax on the built-in gains. 00
Thus, in Gallun v. Commissioner,'0 ' the Tax Court denied a built-in
gain discount in valuing the donor's shares in his closely-held
company. 0 2 The company functioned as both an operating company
and as a holding company.' ° In valuing the entity, the court segregated
the operating assets from the investment portfolio and valued the
investment portfolio under the net asset value approach.' 4 Because the
corporation had no immediate plans to liquidate the portfolio and
because corporate liquidation could be achieved without incurring
tax,
05
the court denied the discount for potential capital gains tax.
Although Gallun was decided earlier, the decision in Estate of
Piper v. Commissioner106 was the foundation of the prospective
liquidation test. 1 7 In Estate of Piper,the donor, deceased at the time of
the case, transferred all the issued and outstanding stock in two

99. See, e.g., Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938, 942 (1982), superseded by statute,
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v.
Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Piper v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1062, 1087 (1979),
superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as
recognizedin Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998).
100. See, e.g., Estate of Piper, 72 T.C. at 1087. But see Estate of Thalheimer v. Comm'r, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 877, 911 (1974) (considering only whether at the time of the transfer there was a
plan of liquidation). The distinction between the first consideration and second consideration is
sometimes confused in the case law. The first consideration looks to whether "liquidation" of the
assets is contemplated, meaning whether the corporation is planning to sell the underlying assets.
The second consideration looks to the consequences of a corporate "liquidation," meaning the
winding up of the company or the distribution of the assets to the shareholders. Under the General
Utilities doctrine, the second consideration led courts to conclude that gain could be avoided.
Therefore, unless the corporation were planning an asset sale, the discount was denied. The
distinction between an asset sale and a corporate liquidation is considered further infra text § IV.B.
101. Gallun v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. 1316 (1974), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d
50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998).
102. Id. at 1321.
103. Id. at 1317.
104. Id. at 1320.
105. Id. at 1321.
106. Estate of Piper v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155
F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998).
107. To date, Estate of Piper has been cited in forty-nine decisions, whereas Gallun has been
cited in nineteen. As a Tax Court opinion, Estate of Piper carries more precedential weight than
Gallun, a Tax Court Memorandum opinion.
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investment corporations. 0 8 Under the net asset value approach, part of
the reduction from fair market value that the donor claimed was
attributable to potential capital gains tax the corporation would incur
upon the sale of its assets.' 0 9 Citing Estate of Cruikshank, Judge
Tannenwald relied on a prospective liquidation test, using the prospect
and effect of liquidation as the criteria for determining the availability of
the discount.1 0 Because there was no evidence of a pending liquidation
or that a liquidation would trigger gain recognition,"' the court denied
the discount.12
Judge Tannenwald's test took root, and in Estate of Andrews v.
Commissioner, 13 the Tax Court based its opinion on the same inquiry.
In Estate of Andrews, the decedent's gross estate included stock in four
closely-held corporations. 14 The decedent owned about twenty percent
of each corporation, and the remaining eighty percent was split evenly
among his four siblings." 5 All four corporations primarily owned and
managed commercial real estate; some also held stocks and bonds." 6 In
valuing the corporations' holding components, the estate calculated the
net asset value of the decedent's shares." 7 The estate argued for a builtin gain discount.'l 8 However, no liquidation was imminent, 119 nor was
there any evidence that liquidation could not be executed without gain
recognition. The court held that mere speculation as to liquidation does
not merit valuation discounts where it is unlikely that the contemplated
108. Estate of Piper, 72 T.C. at 1064. Both investment companies held corporate stock of an
operating company, Piper Aircraft Co. Id. Civil procedure aficionados will note that this is the
same Piper Aircraft Co. that would later star in the famed forum non conveniens case. See Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
109. Estate of Piper,72 T.C. at 1086-87.
110. Id. In so doing, Judge Tannenwald expressly rejected the previous holding of Obermer v.
UnitedStates. 238 F.Supp. 29 (D. Haw. 1964). Accord supra note 94.
111. Although the opinion did not expressly state the principle, corporate liquidation could
have been accomplished tax-free under General Utilities and former I.R.C. §§ 311 and 336 (West
1954). The fact that corporate liquidation would not cause gain recognition made the allowance of
the discount unnecessary.
112. Estate of Piper,72 T.C. at 1087.
113. Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938 (1982), superseded by statute, Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), as recognized in Eisenberg v.
Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998).
114. Id. at 938.
115. Id. at 938-39.
116. Id. at 939.
117. Id. at 942-43.
118. Id. at 942.
119. Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938, 942 (1982), superseded by statute, Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), as recognized in Eisenberg
v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998).
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liquidation expenses, including2 1 tax liability, will ever become due.' 20
The court denied the discount.1
B. Repeal of General Utilities and the Rise of the Built-in Gain Discount
22
While the Tax Court continued to deny the built-in gain discount,
unrest regarding the General Utilities doctrine arose in the corporate tax
world. Exceptions were carved out from the nonrecognition principle
almost from its inception, 23 and concern grew that the General Utilities
doctrine was eroding the corporate tax base by subverting the subchapter
C principle of two-tiered taxation. 124 A major critique leading to the
doctrine's demise came in 1977 from the American Law Institute,125 and
in 1983 the Senate Finance Committee echoed the criticism. 126 To the
extent the General Utilities doctrine remained intact, 127 Congress
responded with statutory changes. 28 By 1986, full repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine had been accomplished, with § 31 l(b) swallowing the
nonrecognition of gain provided in § 311(a), and § 336 requiring29gain
and loss recognition on distributions made in complete liquidation.
As they related to transfer taxation, these changes in the corporate
tax system would eventually erode the precedential value of Estate of
Cruikshank and the prospective liquidation test. Nonetheless, it took
some time for the splash made by the General Utilities repeal to ripple
into the transfer tax world. The initial lag in the Tax Court's recognition
of the transfer tax consequences of the General Utilities repeal resulted

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 103-04 (1986) (denying built-in gain discount for gifts of
corporate stock that donor made from 1979 to 1981), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, as recognized in Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d
50 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Bennett v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1816, 1825 (1993) (denying
built-in gain discount for bequest made upon decedent's death in 1985).
123. See supranote 90.
124. See Walter J. Blum, Taxing Transfers of Incorporated Businesses: A Proposal for
Improvement, 52 TAXEs 516, 523 (1974); Shube, supranote 83, at 41-42.
125. Lobenhofer, supra note 83, at 154.
126. Id. See also George K. Yin, General Utilities Repeal: Is Tax Reform Really Going to Pass
ItBy?,31 TAxNOTES 1111, 1112(1986).
127. See supra note 90.
128. See Lobenhofer, supranote 83, at 158-59; Shube, supranote 83, at 30-41.
129. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085. Since 1986, only
minor changes have been made to I.R.C. §§ 311 and 336. See Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, §§ 1006(e)(8)(B), 1006(e)(21XA), 1006(e)(21)(B), and
1018(d)(5)(E), 102 Stat. 3342, 3401, 3403, 3580. Under current law, corporations are generally
required to recognize gain on the distribution of appreciated assets. But see I.R.C. § 337 (providing
nonrecognition for property distributed to parent in complete liquidation of subsidiary).
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from the Tax Court's failure to consider the way in which the new
subchapter C provisions would yield a different outcome under the
prospective liquidation test. Perhaps a cursory application of the test
resulted as denial of the built-in gain discount had become standard
practice. Indeed, decisions tended to overlook the second consideration
of the prospective liquidation test' 3° -whether a future liquidation of the
corporation could be performed without incurring tax liability. 3 '
Thus, in Estate of Fordv. Commissioner, 32 the Tax Court denied a
built-in gain discount in valuing the investment division of the
decedent's closely-held corporation. 33 As the transfers occurred in
1988 upon the decedent's death, the decision should have discussed the
impact of the 1986 General Utilities repeal. Yet the Tax Court
examined only whether the corporation was considering a plan of
liquidation, 34 not whether liquidation could be performed without
incurring tax. Had it taken this second step, as prior courts had done, the
Tax Court might have recognized that the new subchapter C provisions
would prohibit tax-free liquidation.
Soon after Estate of Ford, however, the Tax Court did realize that
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine would impact the built-in
gain discount, though its opinions resulted only in dicta. In Estate of
Luton v. Commissioner,3 5 the Tax Court emphasized the second
consideration of the prospective liquidation test. 136 However, because
the corporations in question were S corporations, a prospective
liquidation could still be performed without
gain recognition,13 ' and the
3
1
discount.
court denied the built-in gain
The Tax Court also acknowledged the significance of the
subchapter C amendments but declined to apply the new law to the facts

130. This was likely due to the fact that courts often considered the built-in gain discount with
other costs that would be incurred upon liquidation. See Estate of Ford v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1507, 1517 (1993), aff'd, 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995); Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 104
(1986), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085,

as recognizedin Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Thalheimer v.
Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 877, 911 (1974); See also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Memo. 9150001 (Dec. 31,
1991).
131.

See supranote 100.

132. Estate ofFord,66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1507.
133. Id. at 1517.
134. Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Estate of Luton v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994).
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id.
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of Estate of Gray v. Commissioner.139 In Estate of Gray, two irrevocable
trusts, which the decedent had settled inter vivos, purchased real
property from the decedent's closely-held C corporation. 140 The trusts
issued a promissory note as consideration,' 4 1 and the corporation elected
to report its gain on the installment method. 142 Because the trusts were
too highly leveraged, they were unable to repay the note unless they
resold the property. 43 Market conditions proved unfavorable, and at the
time of the Tax Court's decision, payment of the note was seven years
past-due. 144 This fact, coupled with the fact that the corporation could
exercise a tax-free foreclosure, 145 led the court to determine that
recognition of the built-in gain was unlikely.' 46 Still, the taxpayer
argued that the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine required a built-in
gain discount. 47 Although the Tax Court emphasized the importance of
the change in the corporate tax law, it held that the
General Utilities
48
doctrine had no relevance to installment obligations.
Finally, in 1998, the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recognized the transfer tax consequences of the General
Utilities repeal. 49 Both courts issued opinions that reshaped the transfer
tax treatment of built-in gains. The Second Circuit opinion in Eisenberg
v. Commissioner'50 came on appeal from the Tax Court, where the
previous year Judge Hamblen issued his memorandum decision denying
a built-in gain discount. 15' The Second Circuit heard oral arguments in
May of 1998.152 In June of 1998, Judge Chiechi wrote the Tax Court's
opinion rejecting Judge Hamblen's Eisenbergruling, and she announced
in Estate ofDavis v. Commissioner 53 that a built-in gain discount would
now be permitted. 5 4 The Second Circuit thus received a green light
139. Estate of Gray v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1940 (1997).
140. Id. at 1944.
141. Also at issue in the case was whether the note was bona fide debt. Id. at 1946. The court

held that the note was not bona fide. Id.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1944.
Id.
Estate of Gray v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1940, 1944 (1997).
See I.R.C. § 1038 (providing nonrecognition treatment for real property foreclosures).
Estate of Gray, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1947.
Id.
Id. Instead, the disposition of the note would have been governed by I.R.C. § 453B.

149. Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998); Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 110 T.C.
530 (1998).
150. Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 50.

151.

Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1046 (1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998).

152.
153.
154.

Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 50.
Estate of Davis, I10 T.C. at 530.
Id. at 553.
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from the Tax Court and in August of 1998 cited Estate of Davis with
done
approval. 155 It did expressly what the Tax Court had already
57
implicitly156-- overrule Judge Hamblen's opinion in Eisenberg.1
Estate of Davis thus represented a shift in the Tax Court since the
Eisenberg decision,' 58 where the opinion placed significant weight on
the long line of cases denying the built-in gain discount. 159 Eisenberg
involved a transfer of stock in the donor's closely-held corporation,
which owned commercial real property. 160 Although the donor argued
that the General Utilities repeal required a corresponding change in the
transfer tax treatment of built-in gains, Judge Hamblen disagreed.' 61 He
accepted the IRS's argument regarding hypothetical scenarios under
which a corporation might postpone corporate level gain either by
indefinitely holding the property or by transferring the property pursuant
to a nonrecognition provision.162
The facts in Estate of Davis 63 were similar. The taxpayer,
deceased at the time of the opinion, made inter vivos gifts of shares in
his closely-held corporation, the primary asset of which was Winn-Dixie
The IRS issued a notice of deficiency asserting
stock.' 64
undervaluation. 165 The valuation dispute was due in part to the
taxpayer's claim of a built-in gain discount. In an interesting twist, the
IRS faced the challenge of arguing against its own expert, who testified
a built-in gain discount should be allowed, just not to the extent the
taxpayer claimed. 166 Nonetheless, relying on Estate of Cruikshank and
155. Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 50.
156. The Tax Court in Estate of Davis made an unconvincing attempt to distinguish Estate of
Davis from Eisenberg on the basis of the proffered expert testimony. See Estate of Davis, 110 T.C.
at 552 n. 17.
157. The case of Estate of Welch v. Comm 'r, No. 98-2007, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th
Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision), also holds an interesting place on this timeline. Without
mentioning the General Utilities doctrine or its subsequent repeal, the Tax Court denied the built-in
gain discount for 1993 bequests of stock in two closely-held corporations. Estate of Welch v.
Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2252, 2255-56 (1998). The May 1998 opinion in Estate of Welch relied
on the Tax Court's Eisenberg decision from the previous October. Id. at 2256. Less than two
months after Estate of Welch, the Tax Court decided Estate of Davis. 110 T.C. 530 (1998). The
decision on appeal in Estate of Welch came in March of 2000 and reversed the Tax Court. Estate of
Welch, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315.
158. Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1046 (1997).
159. See Eisenberg, 74 T.C.M. at 1048.
160. Eisenberg, 155 F.3dat 51-52.
161. Eisenberg, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1049.
162. Id. The Tax Court cited I.R.C. §§ 351 and 355 as relevant nonrecognition provisions. Id.
163. Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 530 (1998).
164. Id. at 531.
165. See id. at 534.
166. Id. at 545-46.
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its progeny, the IRS asserted that as a matter of law a built-in gain
discount was impermissible. 167 The Tax Court turned to the two
considerations of the prospective liquidation test 1 68 and found that even
if no liquidation were contemplated, the discount would be appropriate if
corporate level tax could not be avoided.1 69 The court recognized the
implications of the General Utilities repeal, but it stressed that repeal
require eventual corporate level recognition in all
alone would 1not
70
circumstances.
Specifically, the 1986 amendments did not eliminate the possibility
that a C corporation could make a § 1362(a) election to be treated as a
subchapter S corporation.' 7' If a corporation were to make the election
and then hold the assets for ten years, corporate level gain could be
avoided. 72 The IRS argued that this technique required denial of the
built-in gain discount and that the General Utilities repeal was
irrelevant. 73 As a factual conclusion, however, the Tax Court found that
the corporation in Estate of Davis was unlikely to make a § 1362(a)
First, the election would unreasonably restrict the
election.' 74
permissible shareholders. 75 Second, the ten-year waiting period would
reduce the company's stock value, rendering it unmarketable; therefore,
the corporation's shareholders would have been unlikely to consent to
the election. 76 Accordingly, the Tax Court found that an HWB and
HWS would have177taken into account the potential tax liability when
valuing the stock.

167. Id. at 546-47 (citing Estate ofCruikshank v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 162, 165 (1947)).
168. Id. at 546-48.
169. Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 530, 550 (1998).
170. Id. at 546 (stating that "[t]he repeal.., did not foreclose the possibility of avoiding capital
gains taxes at the corporate level upon sale of all assets.").
171. Id. at 548-49.
172. Id. at 548; see I.R.C. § 1374(a) and (d)(7).
173. Estate of Davis, I 10 T.C. at 545-46.
174. Id. at 549.
175. Id. at 548. Under I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A), a corporation may be an S corporation only if it
has no more shareholders than the statutory maximum. In 1992, the maximum number of
shareholders permitted was 35. See I.R.C § 1361(b)(l)(A). Furthermore, certain persons, such as C
corporations, are prohibited from being shareholders in S corporations. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B).
176. Estate of Davis, 110 T.C. at 548. Moreover, even if the company were to make an I.R.C.
§ 1362(a) election, any sale of corporate assets within the ten-year waiting period would continue to
be subject to corporate level tax. If such a sale is likely to take place, some built-in gain discount
may still be appropriate. See Estate of Litchfield v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079 (2009)
(permitting built-in gain discount for S corporation in which sales of corporate assets were likely to
occur within ten-years of the I.R.C. § 1362(a) election).
177. Estate of Davis, 110 T.C. at 552.
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Yet this conclusion did not resolve the case. Having determined
that it would allow a built-in gain discount, the court confronted the
question of how large a discount to permit. 78 The court returned to the
first consideration of the prospective liquidation test and examined
79
whether the corporation had planned or contemplated liquidation.
Because the corporation had no plans for liquidation, the court reasoned
80
that a dollar-for-dollar built-in gain discount would be inappropriate.1
The liability would be incurred sometime in the future, not upon an
immediate liquidation. 18' Therefore, the Tax Court concluded that an
amount less than a dollar-for-dollar discount should be applied, and it
82
adopted a figure between two figures expert witnesses proposed. 1
As the Tax Court announced its Estate of Davis decision in the
three-month window between oral argument and the decision on the
Eisenberg appeal, the Second Circuit followed Estate of Davis and
vacated Judge Hamblen's earlier Eisenberg opinion. 8 3 The Second
Circuit gave full expression to the significance of the General Utilities
repeal.18 4
It stated that the previous tax-avoidance strategies
underpinning Estate of Cruikshank and its progeny had been foreclosed
by the 1986 amendments, which had removed a corporation's ability to
avoid gain recognition. 85 The Second Circuit also dismissed the Tax
Court's reliance on gain deferral mechanisms, such as the possibility of
making a subchapter S election. 86 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
allowed the built-in gain discount. 8 7 It remanded the case to the Tax
Court for determination of the discount,'88 noting that a dollar-for-dollar
89
discount would be inappropriate.
178. Id. at 553.
179. Id. at 552-53.
180. Id. at 552.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 552-54.
183. Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 1998).
184. Id. at 54-59.
185. Id. at 54-55. The Second Circuit rejected possible avoidance strategies, such as holding
the property, entering a nonrecognition transaction, or making an I.R.C. § 1362(a) election. Id. at
56-57.
186. Seeid.at56n.14.
187. Id.at 59.
188. Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 1998).
189. Id. at 58 n. 15. The Second Circuit did not reach a conclusion as to the proper amount of
the discount; instead, it left such determination to the Tax Court. However, the Second Circuit
noted that a dollar-for-dollar discount would not be appropriate. It stated, "One might conclude...
that the full amount of the potential capital gains tax should be subtracted from what would
otherwise be the fair market value of the real estate. This would not be a correct conclusion." Id.
See also Estate of Welch v. Comm'r, No. 98-2007, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th Cir. 2000)
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C. The CurrentDebate
What has emerged following the decisions in Estate of Davis and
Eisenberg is a shift in the debate over the built-in gain discount. The
question no longer focuses on whether the discount is permissible;
instead, the battle now centers on how much of a discount should be
allowed. Consistent with Estate ofDavis and Eisenberg, the IRS argues,
and the Tax Court agrees, that the amount allowed should be less than
the dollar-for-dollar discount.' 90 The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have held otherwise.1 91
First, in Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner,192 the Fifth Circuit
permitted a dollar-for-dollar built-in gain discount.1 93 Estate of Jameson
involved the value of the decedent's shares in Johnco, a closely-held
1 94
corporation, the principal asset of which was timber property.
Because the corporation took a conservative stance toward harvesting
the timber, the high value of the older mature trees resulted in significant
built-in gain.' 95 The Tax Court acknowledged this built-in gain would
require a HWS to accept less than the timber's undiscounted fair market
value.1 96 Based upon expert testimony, the Tax Court found a HWB
would expect a twenty percent return on investment in other similar
timber property, and that Johnco's timber was producing a fourteen
percent return on investment.197 The Tax Court used these rates and a
nine-year turn-over rate to discount to present value the future tax
liability and applied the discount accordingly.' 98
(unpublished table decision). In Estate of Welch, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's denial
of the built-in gain discount. See Estate of welch v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2252, 2256 (1998).
The Sixth Circuit cited the Eisenberg approach with approval and remanded to the Tax Court for
further factual findings. Estate of Welch, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315.
190. Estate of Litchfield v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079 (2009); Estate of Jelke v.
Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397 (2005), rev'd, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007); Estate of Dunn v.

Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337 (2000), rev'd, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of Jameson v.
Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383 (1999), rev'd, 267 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001).
191. Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007); Estate of Dunn v.
Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of Jameson v. Comm'r, 267 F.3d 366, 372

(5th Cir. 2001).
192.
193.
194.

267 F.3d at 366.
Id.
Id. at 368.

195. Estate ofJameson, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1385-86.
196. Id. at 1396.
197. Id. at 1396-97.
198. Id. at 1396-97. The Tax Court considered how long it would take for the corporation to
sell the current timber and purge the corporation of the valuation date built-in gain. Id. at 1396.
The court then discounted to present value the amount of tax that would be incurred in each
subsequent year. Id. at 1396-97. As discussed infra text § IV.D., discounting the future gain to
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The Fifth Circuit overruled the Tax Court. 199

Because a HWB

would expect a twenty percent return on a similar investment, the
fourteen percent return Johnco was yielding would force a HWB to
immediately liquidate the corporation. 200 By so doing, the HWB could
use the sale proceeds to reinvest and obtain a higher return on other
similar investments. 20 1 As the HWB would immediately liquidate, the
tax liability on the built-in gain would arise on the date of the
hypothetical liquidation. 20 2 Accordingly, the value of the corporation
would be reduced by the liability on the recognized gain. The Fifth
Circuit remanded to the Tax Court, implying a dollar-for-dollar discount
would be required.20 3
Estate of Jameson served as precedent when the Fifth Circuit ruled
on the built-in gain discount in Estate of Dunn v. Commissioner.2 4 The
decedent owned approximately sixty-three percent of the shares in Dunn
Equipment, a corporation engaged in renting construction equipment. 20 5
Dunn Equipment also had several employees who operated the
equipment, and the company charged for their services.20 6 The
corporation's operating and holding components were valued
respectively using the income approach and the net asset value
approach.20 7
After determining the proper weight to be placed on the operating
component and the holding component, the Tax Court considered the
availability of the built-in gain discount under the net asset value
approach.20 8 The Tax Court received expert testimony stating that
because the return on investment in Dunn Equipment was lower than
what a HWB could derive from lower-risk investments,20 9 the HWB

present value fails to accurately account for the impact of the built-in gain on the value of the
corporation.
199. Estate of Jameson v. Comm'r, 267 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001).
200. Id.at 372.
201. Seeid.
202. The date of the hypothetical liquidation would have been the decedent's date of death.
See id.
203. Id.
204. Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).
205. Id. at 343-44.
206. Id. at 344.
207. Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, 1339-41 (2000), rev'd on other
grounds, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).
208. Id. at 1344-45.
209. The taxpayer could have received a higher yield from risk-free government bonds. Id. at
1340.
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would liquidate the company. 2 10 However, at issue was a sixty-three
percent interest, and under Texas law, a two-thirds vote was necessary to
cause liquidation.2 1' Other investors were committed to the company as
a going concern. 212 Therefore, the Tax Court ruled that the HWB's
inability to cause liquidation required a lower built-in gain discount than
the dollar-for-dollar discount the taxpayer's expert had urged.21 3
The Fifth Circuit disagreed.214 It held that the taxpayer was entitled
to a dollar-for-dollar discount.2 15 The court reasoned that under the net
asset value approach, one must assume the HWB purchases the
corporate shares to obtain ownership of the underlying assets.2 16 Proper
valuation thus requires as a matter of law that a hypothetical liquidation
217
occur on the valuation date, giving rise to a dollar-for-dollar discount.
In response to the Tax Court's inquiry into the probability of liquidation,
the Fifth Circuit stated that such a consideration is inappropriate under
the net asset value approach.2 18 Because the net asset value approach,
on the valuation date, 219 the
according to the court, presumes liquidation
220
"likelihood" of liquidation is 100 percent.
In the most recent appellate decision,22 ' the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit. It allowed a dollar-fordollar discount in Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner,222 where a familyowned C corporation valued under the net asset value approach held
about $179 million in marketable securities and $10 million in other

210. Id.
211.

Id.

212. Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, 1340 (2000), rev'don other grounds,
301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).
213. Id. at 1344-45. The Tax Court allowed a five percent discount, whereas the taxpayer had
argued for a thirty-four percent discount. Id. Note that whether the HWB can actually liquidate the
corporation should not be considered in calculating the amount of the built-in gain discount. The
inability to liquidate should instead be considered a part of the lack of control discount. See infra

text § IV.D.
214. Estate ofDunn v. Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339, 352 (5th Cir. 2002).
215. Id. at 352-53.
216. Id. at 353.
217. Id. at 352-53.
218. Id. at 354. However, the court did find the likelihood of liquidation relevant in
determining the respective weight to be placed on the operating component and the holding
component-if liquidation is unlikely, the operating component may be weighted more heavily. Id.
219. The analysis below demonstrates that this assumption is incorrect. See infra text § W.B.
220. Estate of Dunn, 301 F.3d at 353.
221. See Estate of Litchfield v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079 (2009), discussed infra note
245, for discussion of the most recent Tax Court opinion addressing built-in discounts.
222. Estate ofJelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), rev'g, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397
(2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).
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assets. 22 3 The built-in tax liability on these assets was about $51
million. 224 The corporation's primary objective was long-term capital
growth, which resulted in a relatively low turn-over rate and large builtin gains.225
In the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued for a dollar-for-dollar
discount, reasoning that Estate of Dunn required such an approach as a
matter of law.226 Invoking the Golsen rule, 7 the Tax Court held that it
was not bound by Estate of Dunn, as the taxpayer's appeal would not be
heard in the Fifth Circuit. 228 The Tax Court instead reasoned that
assuming a HWB would liquidate would be erroneous, as the
corporation's investments were outperforming the market.229 Instead of
permitting the dollar-for-dollar discount, the Tax Court relied on the
discounted present value calculations of the government's expert. 230 The
expert calculated the average asset turn-over rate and found that it would
take about sixteen years for the corporation to purge the date of death
built-in gain.23' Dividing the total built-in gain by sixteen, the expert
discounted to present value the tax liability that would be payable on the
gain recognized over the sixteen -year period, and the Tax Court allowed
the discount accordingly.232
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court and
remanded with instructions to apply a dollar-for-dollar discount.23 3 The
Eleventh Circuit criticized the Tax Court's choice of the sixteen-year
period over which the gain would be recognized, stating that only a
223. Id. at 1319.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 1403 (2005), rev'd, 507 F.3d 1317
(2007) (citing Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002)).
227. See Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). The
Golsen rule stands for the proposition that the Tax Court will be bound only by federal court of
appeals decisions that are controlling in the jurisdiction to which the taxpayer would appeal. Id. at
757. The Tax Court does not consider as binding federal court of appeals decisions from
jurisdictions where the taxpayer's appeal would not lie. See id.
228. Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1403 (citing Estate of Dunn, 301 F.3d 339
(5th Cir. 2002)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1404.
231. Id. at 1402.
232. Id. at 1402-03. This approach, though arguably more accurate than the dollar-for-dollar
approach, is also problematic because it ignores the appreciation in the assets. By simply freezing
the built-in gain on the valuation date, calculating the corresponding liability, and discounting that
liability to present value, this approach overlooks the extent to which the built-in gain will impair
the net future value of the investment. See infra text § W.C.
233. Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), rev'g, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397
(2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).
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strategic buyer and not a HWB would take such an approach.234 Instead,
the court ruled that the value of the assets and liabilities should be frozen
on the valuation date and adopted the "arbitrary assumption" that a
hypothetical liquidation take place on the date of death.235 Stressing the
lack of precise rules for calculating the built-in gain discount, the court
adopted this bright-line test, echoing the Fifth Circuit's recognition that
such an approach might be criticized 236
as "'unsophisticated, dogmatic,
wrong."
plain
just
or
simplistic,
overly
In a robust dissent, Judge Cames denounced the majority's
approach.237 The dissent accused the majority of adopting "the judicial
equivalent of the doctrine of ignoble ease., 238 This criticism implied
that the majority failed to labor toward a more accurate calculation,
opting instead to assume a hypothetical liquidation. For Judge Carnes,
the Tax Court's approach might not have been perfect, but it was a better
estimation of the value a HWB would have paid for the decedent's
stock.239 The dissent emphasized that although the majority's holding
would give rise to greater judicial efficiency, the court ought not to
forsake the correct answer for the expedient one.240 Judge' 24Carnes
1
concluded by dissenting from the majority's "perilous delusion."
Dissatisfied with the Eleventh Circuit's "arbitrary assumption," the
Commissioner petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari.242
The petition asserted that the Eleventh Circuit erred, first, by failing to
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id. at 1333 (citing Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 301 F.3d 339, 358 n.36 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 1333-40 (Carnes, J. dissenting).
Id. at 1334. Judge Carnes quoted Teddy Roosevelt as saying:

I wish to preach not the doctrine of ignoble ease but the doctrine of the strenuous life; the
life of toil and effort; of labor and strife; to preach that highest form of success which
comes not to the man who desires mere easy peace but to the man who does not shrink
from danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil, and who out of these wins the splendid
ultimate triumph.
Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1334 (11th Cir. 2007), rev'g, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397
(2005), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008) (quoting Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, The
Doctrine of the Strenuous Life (April 10, 1899) in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY
SPEECHES I (Brian MacArthur, ed., Penguin Books, 1992)).
239. Id. at 1335.
240. Id. at 1337. In addition to lamenting the implications of the majority opinion in the estate
tax area, Judge Carnes criticized the opinion as having a negative ramification for other areas of law
where complex calculations are required. Id. at 1337-40.
241. Id. at 1340.
242. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Comm'r v. Estate of Jelke, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008) (No. 071582).
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conduct the valuation of the corporation's stock as a factual inquiry, and,
second, by requiring a dollar-for-dollar discount as a matter of law.243
The Court denied the Commissioner's petition. 2 "
Although consensus now exists between the Fifth Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit, the Tax Court's opinions reflect an unwillingness to
adopt as a matter of law the dollar-for-dollar discount. Indeed, shortly
after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Estate of Jelke, the Tax
Court again permitted a built-in gain discount that was less than the full
dollar-for-dollar amount.245 Moreover, the decisions rendered by the
Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit are at odds with the Second
Circuit, which stated in Eisenberg that the dollar-for-dollar built-in gain
discount would be inappropriate.246 Although the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit's unpublished 2000 opinion in Welch v. Commissioner,
which adopted the Eisenberg approach,247 does not represent binding
precedent, the decision indicates that the Sixth Circuit may be reluctant
to follow Estate of Dunn and Estate of Jelke. In light of the fact that the
Commissioner has refused to concede and the split among the circuits
remains significant, the issue is ripe for resolution.24 8 However, as the
Supreme Court has refused to provide this much-needed guidance,
federal appellate courts will be left to resolve issues of first impression
in their respective circuits.

Any resolution must balance two competing interests. On the one
hand, Estate of Dunn and Estate of Jelke recognize that a precise
calculation of the discount in every case is cumbersome. The judicial

243.
244.
245.
cases, in

Id.
Estate of Jelke v. Comm'r, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).
Estate of Litchfield v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079 (2009). In contrast to other recent
Estate of Litchfield, the taxpayer did not argue for the full dollar-for-dollar amount.

Because the Second Circuit would have jurisdiction over the taxpayer's appeal, the taxpayer's
appraiser presumably yielded to Eisenberg in not claiming a dollar-for-dollar discount. However,
the taxpayer successfully argued for a built-in gain discount in a closely-held C corporation equal to
The taxpayer also
approximately ninety-one percent of the full dollar-for-dollar amount.

successfully argued for a built-in gain discount for stock in an S corporation, predicting that some of
the S corporation's assets would be sold within ten years of having made a § 1362(a) election and
would thereby incur corporate level tax. Although the Estate of Litchfield opinion appropriately

recognizes that post-transfer appreciation will have some impact on the amount of the built-in gain
discount, it still seems to miss the mark by focusing on the relationship between this appreciation
and the future tax liability rather than on the impact of the built-in gain on net future cash value of
the investment. See infra text § IV.C.
246. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
247. See Estate of Welch v. Comm'r, No. 98-2007, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th Cir.

2000) (unpublished table decision).
248. See Robert Willens, Eleventh Circuit in Jelke Offers Taxpayer-Friendly Resolution for
Estate Valuation Issues Post-TRA 1986,26 TAX MGM'T. WEEKLY REPORT 1736, 1737 (2007).
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resources required to properly adjudicate the intricate mathematics are
substantial. However, as Judge Cames's dissent makes clear, courts are
charged with the duty of rendering just and accurate decisions, even
when such decisions require a "'life of toil and effort.', 249 Balancing
these competing objectives is challenging but possible.
By
reconsidering the precedent established by Estate of Cruikshank and its
progeny, a test can be fashioned to decide cases in both an efficient and
accurate manner.

IV. A MODIFIED LIQUIDATION TEST
A. ConceptualFoundation
Part of the divergence among the circuits arguably arises from their
failure to consider the possible continuing influence of the prospective
liquidation test. Although repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
antiquated the prospective liquidation test, the logical foundation of the
test should have survived. The prospective liquidation test ought not to
be thrown out; instead, it should be modified to respond to the change in
corporate tax law. To reshape the prospective liquidation test, two
modifications are in order.
First, the prospective liquidation test was flawed from the outset
because of the approach taken under its first consideration. By looking
at whether at the time of the transfer the corporation had plans to
liquidate the underlying assets, courts erroneously examined the problem
from the viewpoint of the actual shareholders rather than from the
viewpoint of the HWB. 250 The characteristics of the actual shareholders
might not mirror the characteristics of the HWB. 2 1 For example, actual
shareholders might be influenced by family ties, overly optimistic
predictions of future performance, or risk aversion. These influences
could prevent liquidation in circumstances under which such liquidation
might yield greater economic benefits. A HWB would not be so
encumbered. Instead, the HWB would engage in a mechanistic analysis
of the future value of the investment to determine what course of action
is economically superior. 2 Courts should use such an approach as the

249.
250.
251.
252.

Estate of Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1334 (Cames, J, dissenting).
See VALUATION, supra note 21, 6.03[6][c], at 6-50 to 6-56.
See supranote 28 and accompanying text.
See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
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first consideration of the modified liquidation test to determine whether
the HWB has an incentive to liquidate.
Second, under the prospective liquidation test, courts considered
whether future liquidation could be performed without recognizing
gain.253 Under the modified liquidation test, the inquiry is not whether
gain will be recognized; rather, it is a question of when recognition will
occur. The result of the first consideration conditions the outcome of the
second. If the HWB has the incentive to liquidate immediately, then
gain will be recognized immediately. In such circumstances, the dollarfor-dollar approach would be appropriate. If the HWB has the incentive
to retain assets within the corporation, then the gain will be recognized
in the future. In this case, an amount less than the dollar-for-dollar
discount would be the accurate result. Thus, the second consideration of
the modified liquidation test would require courts to calculate the
amount of the discount by first considering the HWB's incentive to
liquidate.
Evaluating the HWB 's course of action requires an analysis of the
tax consequences of distributing the corporation's assets, either in kind
or as cash sale proceeds, to the HWB. Because the tax consequences of
every corporate distribution 254 cannot be generalized, judicial application
of the modified liquidation test may be complex in some circumstances.
Driving this complexity is whether the distribution is taxed as a dividend
or as a sale or exchange.
As a basic rule, corporate distributions are treated as dividends.2 55
Determining the amount of the dividend requires a computation of the
corporation's earnings and profits. 6 To the extent that current and
accumulated earnings and profits are less than the amount of the
distribution, the distribution is treated first as a recovery of capital and
then as taxable gain.257 Two exceptions circumvent dividend treatment.
First, § 302(b) provides that certain corporate distributions in redemption
of a shareholder's stock may be treated as a sale or exchange of the

253. See supranote 100 and accompanying text.
254. Because of complexities in corporate tax law, the meanings of the terms "distribution" and
"liquidation" are important to note. A distribution is any transfer of property, including money, to a
shareholder in respect to the shareholder's stock. A distribution can also be a part of a liquidation.
The shareholder can liquidate the shareholder's interest in the corporation by receiving a
The
distribution in complete redemption of the shareholder's interest in the corporation.
corporation can liquidate all of its assets, either by distributing the assets in-kind or by selling the
assets and distributing the cash proceeds.
255. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c) and 316; see also I.R.C. § 312.
256. See I.R.C. § 316.
257. I.R.C. § 301(c).
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stock.258 Second, § 331 provides that distributions made to a shareholder
in complete liquidation of a corporation are deemed to be received in
exchange for the stock.259
Distinguishing between dividend treatment and sale or exchange
treatment is important because it influences the amount of the
distribution that is taxed. Where a taxpayer receives a dividend and
there are sufficient earnings and profits, the entire amount of the
distribution is taxed; 260 where a taxpayer receives sale or exchange
treatment, tax is imposed on the amount by which the distribution
exceeds the taxpayer's basis in the stock. 26' Typically, an individual
taxpayer prefers sale or exchange treatment because the immediate
recovery of capital results in less tax liability. 262 For reasons discussed
below, 263 the ensuing analysis treats any distribution to the HWB as
occurring either in liquidation of the HWB's interest in the corporation,
thereby receiving sale or exchange treatment under § 302(b)(3), or in
liquidation of the entire corporation, thereby receiving sale or exchange
treatment under § 331.
B. Determining the Incentive to Liquidate
Whether the HWB would immediately liquidate depends on what
course of action places the HWB in the best economic position, as the
HWB is presumed to maximize economic welfare. The HWB will
choose the option that yields the highest net future value. To select the
optimal choice, the HWB must first make certain threshold
determinations.
The HWB must know the current value of the
corporation's underlying assets and the corporation's basis in those
assets.
Next, the HWB must determine the rate at which the
corporation's assets are appreciating and the rate that the market would

258. Sale or exchange treatment is provided in the following circumstances: under I.R.C. §
302(b)(1), where the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend; under I.R.C. §
302(b)(2), where the redemption is substantially disproportionate compared to the redemption of
other shareholders' interests; under I.R.C. § 302(b)(3), where the redemption terminates the
shareholder's interest in the corporation; under I.R.C. § 302(b)(4), where the redemption is in partial
liquidation of the corporation.
259. I.R.C. § 331(a).
260. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 312, and 316.
261. See I.R.C. §§ 302(b) and 1001.
262. Because of the immediate recovery of capital, this is true even when dividends are taxed
at the preferential 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) rate. The preference for sale or exchange treatment will increase
if the preferential dividend rate sunsets on December 31, 2009 as scheduled. See Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 303, 117 Stat. 752, 764.
263. See infra text § IV.D.
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provide for an investment of similar risk and duration. The HWB must
also project a holding period for which the assets or proceeds will be
invested. Finally, the HWB will apply the corporate and individual rates
at which gains on these assets would be taxed. The HWB can then
calculate the net future cash value of the investment as of the end of the
holding period. 264 These factually determined values and the calculated
values for which they are relevant appear in Figure 1. Importantly,
265
courts regularly determine these values during valuation proceedings.
Once these values are ascertained, the HWB has four options for
converting the corporation's assets into future cash.266
Figure 1
Provided:
CV
AB In
ra
rm

Current value of assets
Corporation's adjusted basis in its assets
Asset appreciation rate
Market appreciation rate

n
Rco
Rind

Projected holding period
Corporate income tax rate (35% rate assumed)
Individual income tax rate (15% rate assumed)

Calculated:
AB Out
Gain In
Gain Out
Net CVIn

HWB's basis
Corporation's gain recognized
HWB's gain recognized
Net current value to corporation

Net CV Out
FV
Net FVIn
Net FV Out
d
DCV

Net current value to HWB
Future value of assets
Net future value to corporation
Net future cash value to HWB
Discount (as a percent)
Discounted current value

264. Note that many of the initial values may change during the period the HWB anticipates
holding the investment. For example, the asset appreciation rate and the market appreciation rate
are likely to vary significantly over time. However, the relevant determination must be made as of
the valuation date. Future fluctuations are irrelevant, as valuation occurs on the valuation date with
all relevant information known or reasonably foreseeable as of that date.
265. See infra notes 314-316 and accompanying figures.
266. The ensuing discussion assumes that the HWB has sufficient voting control to determine
the corporation's actions. This assumption is for hypothetical purposes only, however, and if the
actual shares the HWB owns are insufficient to control the corporation, further adjustments can be
made with a lack of control discount as discussed infra text § I.D.
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First, the HWB can select an "asset sale" option by selling the
corporation's assets, reinvesting the proceeds to acquire new corporate
assets, selling the new assets at the end of the projected holding period,
and distributing the cash proceeds from the corporation. To determine
net future cash value, the HWB must first calculate the consequences of
incurring gain on the sale of the underlying assets. This gain will equal
the value of the assets less the corporation's adjusted basis in the
assets.26 7 The gain will be taxed at the corporate tax rate,268 and the
corporation will be left with net proceeds equal to the value of the assets
less the tax incurred.26 9 Once the corporation holds the net proceeds, it
will reinvest. The corporation must determine the rate of return the
market would provide 270 for an investment of similar risk to the
corporation's original assets. The future value of the new investment
will be a function of this market appreciation rate and the projected
holding period.27' When the corporation sells these assets at the end 2of
72
the corporation will recognize gain
the projected holding period,
273
subject to corporate level tax.
The corporation will then distribute the net proceeds.274 Under §
302(b)(3) or § 331,275 the HWB will recognize gain or loss equal to the
net proceeds distributed less the HWB's basis in the stock.276 The
HWB's § 1012 cost basis will equal the hypothetical purchase price,
which is the stock's discounted current value.277 Because the discounted
current value under the asset sale option will always be determined with
a dollar-for-dollar discount on account of the fact that the gain is
triggered immediately, the discounted current value equals the net
current value in the corporation following gain recognition and payment
of tax.278 This gain is taxed at the applicable individual capital gains

267. Calculated as Gain In = CV- AB In.
268. Calculated as Tax = GainIn x Rco.
269. Calculated as Net CVIn = CV- Tax.
270. Represented as rm.
271. Calculated as FV= Net CVIn x (I + rm)".
272. Calculated as Gain In = FV- AB In. Note that the new AB In would equal Net CV In as
the corporation would have reinvested the net sale proceeds, taking a § 1012 cost basis.
273. Calculated as Tax = GainIn x Rco.
274. Calculated as Net FVIn = FV- Tax.
275. See supratext § IV.A.
276. Calculated as Gain Out = Net FV In - AB Out.
277. Represented as AB Out = DCV.
278. Calculated as Net CVIn = AB Out = DCV. Technically, the calculation is more complex
than this. Because AB Out equals DCV, the computation of AB Out and of d requires the isolation
of an interdependent variable. However, this is easily resolved because under the corporate
liquidation model, d always equals Rco x (CV - AB In), which allows for the isolation d as the
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rate,279 and the HWB has cash-in-hand equal to the distributed proceeds
less the HWB's tax.280 Figure 2A demonstrates the calculation of net
future cash value where current value equals $200,000, the corporation's
basis in its assets equals $10,000, and the market appreciation rate
equals ten percent.
Figure 2A
rm = 10%; n = 5

Figure 2B
rm = 10%; n = 5

Asset Sale

Cash Liq.

CV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

200,000
(10,000)
190,000
(66,500)

CV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

200,000
(10,000)

Net CVIn
AB Out

133,500
(133,500)

Net CVIn
AB Out

133,500
(133,500)

190,000
(66,500)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

0
(0)

Net CV Out

Net CV Out

133,500

FV
AB In

215,003

FV
AB In

215,003
(133,500)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

81,503
(28,526)

Net FVIn
AB Out

186,477
(133,500)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net FV Out

52,977
(7,947)
178,530

Gain In
Tax (Rco)
Net FV In
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net FV Out

(133,500)
81,503
(12,225)
202,778

Second, the HWB can choose a "cash liquidation" option by selling
the underlying assets, distributing the proceeds, reinvesting the proceeds
to acquire new assets outside the corporation, and cashing out at the end

interdependent variable, which leads to the calculation of DCV. DCV equals CVx (l-d), which in
turn equals AB Out.
279. Calculated as Tax = Gain Out x Rind.
280. Calculated as Net FV Out = Net FVIn - Tax. This option is advantageous only when the
corporate tax rate is lower than the HWB's individual rate. Because corporate rates exceed the
preferential fifteen percent capital gain rate, this option is of minor importance under current law.
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of the projected holding period. Under this option, the HWB would
again calculate gain on the sale of the underlying assets, which equals
the value of the assets less the corporation's basis in the assets. 28 ' The
gain will be taxed at the corporate tax rate,282 and the corporation will
retain net proceeds equal to the value of the assets less the tax
incurred.283
Next, the HWB must determine the tax consequences of
distributing the net proceeds. Under § 302(b)(3) or § 33 1,284 the HWB
will recognize gain or loss equal to the distributed net proceeds less the
HWB's basis in the stock. 285 Again, the HWB's § 1012 cost basis in the
stock will equal the hypothetical purchase price, which is the stock's
discounted current value.2 86 The discounted current value under the cash
liquidation option will always be determined with a dollar-for-dollar
discount. Therefore, the discounted current value equals the net current
value in the corporation following gain recognition and payment of
tax.287 For this reason, the HWB will always have zero gain recognized
on the distribution.
Once the HWB has the net proceeds in hand, the HWB will
reinvest. The future value of this investment will be a function of the
market appreciation rate and the projected holding period.288 At the end
of the projected holding period, the HWB will be taxed directly on the
gain as the investment is held outside the corporation. The gain will
equal the future value of the investment less the net proceeds the HWB
reinvested. 289 The gain will be subject to tax at the HWB's rates, 290 and
the net future cash value will equal the future value less the tax.29'
Figure 2B demonstrates the application of this option.
Third, the HWB can engage in an "in-kind liquidation" option. The
calculation of the net future cash value under this option is identical to
Rather than receiving a
the second option, with one exception.
distribution of cash proceeds, the HWB receives the actual underlying

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
AB Out.
290.
291.

Calculated as Gain In = CV- AB In.
Calculated as Tax = Gain In x Rco.
Calculated as Net CVIn = CV- Tax.
See supra text § V.A.
Calculated as Gain Out =Net CV In - AB Out.
Represented as AB Out = DCV.
Calculated as Net CVIn = AB Out = DCV. See supranote 278.
Calculated as FV = Net CV Out x (1 + rm)".
Calculated as Gain Out = FV- AB Out. Note that Net CV Out would be the HWB's new
Calculated as Tax = Gain Out x Rind.
Calculated as Net FV Out = FV- Tax.
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assets.292 Thus, instead of reinvesting the cash proceeds at the prevailing
market appreciation rate, the HWB will hold the original assets from the
in-kind liquidation, which will appreciate at the asset appreciation
rate.293 Figure 2C demonstrates the application of this option.
Fourth, the HWB can simply retain the assets inside the
corporation, sell the assets at the end of the projected holding period, and
then distribute the proceeds net of corporate tax. Under this "asset hold"
option, there is no initial tax incurred. Instead, the current value of the
assets increases over the projected holding period at the asset
appreciation rate, and the future value of the assets remains in the
corporation. 294 At the end of the projected holding period, the
corporation will sell the assets and distribute the cash proceeds to the
HWB. The sale results in gain recognition 295 and corporate tax
liability.296 The HWB receives a cash distribution of the net future value

inside the corporation.297
Under § 302(b)(3) or § 331,298 the HWB will recognize gain or loss
on receipt of the distribution. The HWB's basis in the stock will be a §
1012 cost basis equal to the hypothetical purchase price, which is the
stock's discounted current value. 299 This creates the problem of an
interdependent variable as the discounted current value is a function of
the HWB's basis and the basis is a function of the discounted current
value. To resolve this, the discount can be represented algebraically
without regard to the HWB's basis, and the discounted current value can
be computed accordingly.3 °°

292. This means that the corporation does not recognize gain as the result of actually selling
the asset. Instead I.R.C. § 311 or I.R.C. § 336 would dictate the corporate level recognition event.
Where I.R.C. § 311 applies, the corporation recognizes gain on the in-kind distribution. Where
I.R.C. § 336 applies, the corporation recognizes gain on distributions in complete liquidation. Note
that this assumes that I.R.C. § 301 does not apply, the rationale for which is discussed infra text §
IV.D. It also assumes severability of the assets such that the corporation can pay the tax. Where the
asset is not severable, the HWB must be presumed to transfer sufficient cash to the corporation to
pay the liability.
293. Under the cash liquidation option, FVwas calculated as Net CVIn x (I + rim)". See supra
note 271 and accompanying text. Under the in-kind liquidation option, FV is calculated as Net CV
In x (1 + ra)". A difference in future value results if rm differs from ra. See infra Figure 6A.
294. Calculated as FV= CVx (I + ra)'.

295. Calculated as GainIn = FV- AB In.
296. Calculated as Tax = Gain In x Rco.
297.

Calculated as Net FVIn = FV- Tax.

298. See supra text § IV.A.
299. Represented as AB Out = DCV.
300. See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
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Figure 2D
ra = 10%; n = 5

Figure 2C
ra = 10%; n = 5

Asset Hold

In-Kind Liq.

200,000
(10,000)

190,000
(66,500)

CV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

133,500
(133,500)

Net CVIn
AB Out

200,000
(152,392)

CV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

200,000
(10,000)

Net CVIn
AB Out
Gain Out

Tax (Rind)

0
(0)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

Net CV Out

133,500

Net CV Out

FV
AB In

215,003

FV
AB In

322,102
(10,000)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

312,102
(109,236)

Net FVIn
AB Out

(133,500)

Net FVIn
AB Out

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

81,503
(12,225)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

212,866
(152,392)
60,474
(9,071)

Net FV Out

202,778

Net FV Out

203,795

Once this value is known, the HWB can calculate gain on the
distribution,30' which will be subject to tax.30 2 The net future cash value
will thus equal the net future value inside the corporation less the tax
liability that the HWB incurs upon receipt of the distribution.30 3 Figure
2D demonstrates this option.

301. Calculated as Gain Out =Net FVIn -AB Out.
302. Calculated as Tax = Gain Out x Rind.
303. Calculated as Net FV Out = Net FV In - Tax. The same result would arise if the
corporation were to distribute the assets in-kind, as the corporation would recognize gain under
I.R.C. § 311 or I.R.C. § 336. The in-kind distribution would be net of tax, and the HWB would
receive a distribution equal to the future value less the tax. The HWB would take an I.R.C. § 334(a)
basis in the property equal to its fair market value, and an immediate sale at fair market value would
result in zero gain recognized. Following the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, the gain
recognition required by I.R.C. § 311 or I.R.C. § 336 foreclosed the possibility of distributing assets
in-kind without recognizing gain.
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Once the net future cash value under each option is determined, the
HWB must compare the results. 304 The HWB will choose the option that
results in the greatest net future cash value, as that choice will maximize
the HWB's economic position. Figure 2E shows this comparison.
Because the asset hold option yields the highest net future cash value,
$203,795, the HWB will choose to hold the assets in the corporation.
The amount of the built-in gain on the valuation date influences which
option is economically superior. Because more tax liability would be
immediately incurred, the benefit of deferring tax by retaining the assets
inside the corporation increases when the built-in gain is larger. A
30 5
comparison of Figure 2E with Figure 3A demonstrates this principle.

304. The computation can be simplified by using algebraic formulae and inputting the provided
values into the equations. The formulae are as follows:
For asset sale option, net future cash value equals:
(1 - Rind)[CV(l - Rco) + RcoABIn][(l - Rco)(1 + rm) + Rco] + C yRin

CV(I-Rco)+RcoABIn1
[CV(1 - Rco)+ RcoCVj

For cash liquidation option, net future cash value equals:
[CV(1 - Rco) + RcoABIn][(l - Rind)(l + rn)" + Rind]

For in-kind liquidation option, net future cash value equals:
[CV(I - Rco) + RcoABIn][(l - Rind)(l + ra)s + Rind]

For asset hold option, net future cash value equals:
(1 - Rind)[CV(l - Rco)(l + ra)" + RcoAB In] +

[

ind CV(I - Rco)( + ra)"+ RcoAB In1
SCV( - Rco)(l + ra)" + RcoCV

J

305. In Figure 2E, the built-in gain is $190,000; the asset hold option is economically superior
to the liquidation options by $1,017, the difference between $203,795 and $202,778. In Figure 3A,
the built-in gain is $195,000; the asset hold option is economically superior to the liquidation
options by $2,000, the difference between $202,119 and $200,119. The economic benefit of $2,000
in Figure 3A is greater than the economic benefit of $1,017 in Figure 2E because the built-in gain in
Figure 3A is larger than the built-in gain in Figure 2E.
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Figure 2E
ra = 10%; rm = 10%; n = 5
Asset Sale

Cash. Liq.

In-Kind Liq.

CV
AB In

200,000
(10,000)

200,000
(10,000)

200,000
(10,000)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

190,000
(66,500)

190,000
(66,500)

190,000
(66,500)

Net CV In
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

133,500
(133,500)

133,500
(133,500)
0
(0)

133,500
(133,500)

133,500

133,500

215,003
(133,500)

215,003
....

215,003

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

81,503
(28,526)

....
....

Net FV n
AB Out

186,477
(133,500)

....
(133,500)

Net CV Out
FV
AB In

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net FV Out

--

52,977
(7,947)
178,530

Asset Hold
200,000
(10,000)

200,000
(152,392)

0
(0)
-

322,102
(10,000)
312,102
(109,236)

(133,500)

212,866
(152,392)

81,503
(12,225)

81,503
(12,225)

60,474
(9,071)

202,778

202,778

203,795
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Figure 3A
ra = 10%; rm = 10%; n = 5
Asset Sale

Cash. Lig.

In-Kind Liq.

Asset Hold

CV
AB In

200,000
(5,000)
195,000
(68,250)

200,000
(5,000)
195,000
(68,250)

200,000
(5,000)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

200,000
(5,000)
195,000
(68,250)

131,750
(131,750)

131,750
(131,750)

131,750
(131,750)

200,000
(151,139)

Net CVIn
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net CV Out

--

--

0

0

n

A

131,750

131,750
212,185

FV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

212,185
(131,750)
80,435
(28,152)

212,185
....
....
....

Net FVIn
AB Out

184,033
(131,750)

....
(131,750)

WI2Kv

--

--

322,102
(5,000)
317,102
(110,986)

(131,750)

211,116
(151,139)
59,977
(8,997)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

52,283
(7,842)

80,435
(12,065)

80,435
(12,065)

Net FV Out

176,190

200,119

200,119

202,119

However, where the built-in gain is smaller, the HWB's preference
may shift, as a comparison of Figure 2E with Figure 4A shows.3 °6
Because the built-in gain is smaller, the tax consequences of an
immediate corporate-level tax are no longer a barrier to liquidating.

306. In Figure 2E, the built-in gain is $190,000; the asset hold option is economically superior
to the liquidation options by $1,017, the difference between $203,795 and $202,778. In Figure 4A,
the built-in gain is $150,000; the liquidation options are economically superior to the asset hold
option by $6,844, the difference between $224,042 and $217,198.
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Figure 4A
ra = 10%; rm = 10%; n = 5
Asset Sale

Cash. Liq.

In-Kind Lig.

CV
AB In

200,000
(50,000)

200,000
(50,000)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

150,000
(52,500)

200,000
(50,000)
150,000
(52,500)

Net CVIn
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

147,500
(147,500)

147,500
(147,500)
0

147,500
(147,500)
0

--

fn
'.',

(rA\
' ,,

Net CV Out

--

147,500

147,500

237,550
....

237,550

Asset Hold
200,000
(50,000)

150,000
(52,500)
200,000
(162,415)

--

--

FV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

237,550
(147,500)
90,050
(31,518)

322,102
(50,000)
272,102
(95,236)

Net FV In
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

206,032
(147,500)
58,532
(8,780)

Net FV Out

197,252

90,050
(13,508)

(147,500)
90,050
(13,508)

226,866
(162,415)
64,451
(9,668)

224,042

224,042

217,198

(147,500)

The amount of the built-in gain is not the only consideration; the
decision is also a function of the projected holding period. If the HWB
holds the assets inside the corporation, appreciation remains subject to
Once this appreciation
corporate-level and individual-level tax.
becomes large enough, this two-tiered system of taxation negates the
benefit of having avoided the initial gain recognition that would have
occurred upon liquidation. A comparison of Figure 2E with Figure 5A
demonstrates this principle.0 7
307. In Figure 2E, the built-in gain is $190,000, and the projected holding period is five years;
the asset hold option is economically superior to the liquidation options by $1,017, the difference
between $203,795 and $202,778. In Figure 5A, the built-in gain is again $190,000, but the
projected holding period is eleven years; the liquidation options are economically superior to the
asset hold option by $63, the difference between $343,782 and $343,719.
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Figure 5A
ra= 10%; rm = 10%;n

11

Asset Sale

Cash. Liq.

In-Kind Liq.

200,000
(10,000)

200,000
(10,000)

200,000
(10,000)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

190,000
(66,500)

190,000
(66,500)

190,000
(66,500)

Net CVln
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

133,5 00
(133,5( 00)

133,500
(133,500)

133,500
(133,500)

--

0

--

(0)

0
(0)

CV

AB In

Net CV Out

--

133,500

133,500

380,891

380,891

Asset Hold
200,000
(10,000)

200,000
(169,835)

FV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

380,891
(133,500)

Net FVIn
AB Out

294,304
(133,500)

(133,500)

(133,500)

374,405
(169,835)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

160,804
(24,121)

247,391
(37,109)

247,391
(37,109)

204,570
(30,686)

Net FV Out

270,183

343,782

343,782

343,719

247,391
(86.587)

570,623
(10,000)
560,623
(196.218)

As in Figure 4A, where liquidation is preferred and the asset
appreciation rate equals the market appreciation rate, the HWB will be
indifferent as to cash liquidation and in-kind liquidation.3 °8 However,
where the market appreciation rate exceeds the asset appreciation rate,
the HWB will prefer cash liquidation so that the HWB can reinvest at
the higher market appreciation rate. Figure 6A demonstrates this
comparison. °9 Conversely, where the asset appreciation rate exceeds

308. The net future cash value under the cash liquidation option equals $224,042. The net
future cash value under the in-kind liquidation option also equals $224,042. The HWB would be
indifferent between the two options.
309. The cash liquidation option is economically superior to the in-kind liquidation option by
$50,257, the difference between $274,299 and $224,042.
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the market appreciation rate, the HWB would prefer in-kind liquidation
because of the higher rate at which the assets appreciate.3 1 °
Figure 6A
ra = 10%; rn = 15%; n = 5

Asset Sale

Cash. Liq.

In-Kind Lig.

200,000
(50,000)
150,000
(52,500)

200,000
(50,000)
150,000
(52,500)

200,000
(50,000)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

200,000
(50,000)
150,000
(52,500)

Net CVIn
AB Out

147,500
(147,500)

147,500
(147,500)

147,500
(147,500)

200,000
(162,415)

CV
AB In

Asset Hold

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

--

v

v

--

Net CV Out

--

147,500

147,500

--

296,675
....

237,550

0

0
IA

FV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

296,675
(147,500)
(52,211)

--

(95,236)

Net FVIn
AB Out

244,464
(147,500)

--

(147,500)

(147,50 10)

226,866
(162,415)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

96,964
(14,545)

149,175
(22,376)

90,05 0
(13,50 18)

64,451
(9,668)

Net FV Out

229,919

274,299

224,04 2

149 175

322,102
(50,000)
979 109

....

217,198

The principles demonstrated above are by no means novel
economic analysis. They represent simple tax-rate arbitrage with
varying rates of return. The significance, however, is to expose the
flawed assumption in Estate of Dunn and Estate ofJelke. Assuming that
a hypothetical liquidation always occurs on the valuation date misapplies
previously well-settled law. A fundamental characteristic about the
hypothetical parties is that they seek to maximize their own economic
advantage. This principle yields the judicial maxim that courts must not
310. For example, if the market appreciation rate and the asset appreciation rate in Figure 6A
were reversed, the net future cash values of the cash liquidation option and the in-kind liquidation
option would simply be reversed as well. The in-kind liquidation option would be economically
superior to the cash liquidation option by $50,257, the difference between $274,299 and $224,042.
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assume the hypothetical parties engage in transactions contrary to wealth
maximization.1 If courts are to uphold this maxim, then they should
not assume when determining the built-in gain discount that as a matter
of law a HWB liquidates. As Figure 2E and Figure 3A demonstrate,
there are indeed situations where holding the asset inside the corporation
produces a superior economic result compared to liquidating. In fact,
conventional wisdom regarding corporate acquisitions suggests the norm
would be holding the assets rather than liquidating.1 2
Furthermore, holding as a matter of law that a HWB liquidates
misconstrues a fundamental principle of net asset valuation. The net
asset value approach assumes that the HPWB purchases the stock to
obtain ownership of the underlying assets; but as courts have stated, this
does not mean the only benefit of those assets is conversion into cash.3 13
As a matter of law, this principle is sound. As a matter of economics,
when the asset appreciation rate exceeds the market appreciation rate,
this principle is undeniable.
Applying this test to the facts presented in Estate of Jameson,
Estate of Dunn, and Estate of Jelke, it is evident that whether a HWB
would liquidate can be determined from facts courts regularly gather.
The values found in the respective cases demonstrate how the courts
could have calculated the built-in gain under a modified liquidation test,
as demonstrated in Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9.

311. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
312. See Glenn E. Coven, Taxing CorporateAcquisitions:A Proposalfor Mandatory Uniform
Rules, 44 TAx L. REV. 145, 197 (1989).
313. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. For this reason, in Estate of Dunn the Fifth
Circuit erred in ruling that a HWB would immediately convert the assets to cash. See 301 F.3d 339,
353 (5th Cir. 2002).
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3 14

Figure 7 (Estate ofJameson)

ra = 14%; rm = 20%; n = 4.5

Asset Sale

Cash. Liq.

In-Kind Liq.

Asset Hold

6,000,000
(217,850)

6,000,000
(217,850)

6,000,000
(217,850)

6,000,000
(217,850)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

5,782,150
(2,023,753)

5,782,150
(2,023,753)

5,782,150
(2,023,753)

Net CV In
AB Out

3,976,247
(3,976,247)

3,976,247
(3,976,247)

3,976,247
(3,976,247)

CV

AB In

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

--

Net CV Out

--

0
A''

6,000,000
(4,670,469)

0
(A

'.'.,

--

3,976,247

3,976,247

--

9,032,106
....

7,170,431

kyJ

FV
AB In

9,032,106
(3,976,247)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

5,055,859
(1,769,551)

Net FVIn
AB Out

(3,976,247)
5,055,859
(758,379)

(3,976,247)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

7,262,555
(3,976,247)
3,286,308
(492,946)

(479,128)

2,438,711
(365,807)

Net FV Out

6,769,609

8,273,727

6,691,303

6,743,373

....
....

10,819,896
(217,850)
10,602,046
(3,710,716)

3,194,184

7,109,180
(4,670,469)

314. The values in Figure 7 are calculated using the factual findings in Estate of Jameson v.
Comm'r, 267 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001). In Estate of Jameson, the current value of the assets was
$6,000,000. Id. at 368. The corporation's basis in those assets was $217,850. Id. The asset
appreciation rate was fourteen percent, and the market appreciation rate was twenty percent. See id.
at 372. The Tax Court used a nine-year turn-over rate, meaning that all of the corporation's current
assets would be sold over nine years. Estate of Jameson v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383, 1397
(5th Cir. 2001). Rather than calculating nine blocks to account for each year's turn-over, see infra
text § IV.D, Figure 7 uses a projected holding period of four and one-half years as the mean of the
projected holding periods.
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Figure 8 (Estate of Dunn)

3 15

ra = 6%; rm = 8%; n = 5

CV
AB In

Asset Sale

Cash. Liq.

In-Kind Liq.

Asset Hold

7,519,439

7,519,439

7,519,439

7,519,439

(410,439)

(410,439)

(410,439)

(410,439)

Gain In

7,109,000

7,109,000

7,109,000

--

Tax (Rco)

(2,488,150)

(2,488,150)

(2,488,150)

--

Net CVIn

5,031,289

5,031,289

5,031,289

7,519,439

AB Out

(5,031,289)

(5,031,289)

(5,031,289)

(5,479,715)

Gain Out

--

0

0

--

Tax (Rind)

--

(0)

(0)

--

Net CV Out

--

5,031,289

5,031,289

--

7,392,614

7,392,614

6,733,000

10,062,706

FV
ABIn

(5,031,289)

....

2,361,325

(410,439)

....

9,652,267

Tax (Rco)

(826,464)

....

(3,378,293)

Net FV In

6,566,150

....

6,684,413

AB Out

(5,031,289)

(5,031,289)

(5,031,289)

(5,479,715)

1,534,861

2,361,325

1,701,711

1,204,698

GainIn

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net FV Out

(230,229)
6,335,921

(354,199)
7,038,415

(255,257)
6,477,743

(180,705)
6,503,708

315. The values in Figure 8 are calculated using the factual findings in Estate of Dunn v.
Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, 1344 (2000). In Estate of Dunn, the current value of the assets
was $7,519,439. Id. at 1344. The corporation's built-in gain in those assets was $7,109,000. Id.
Therefore, the corporation's basis in the assets was the difference between the current value and
built-in gain, which equaled $410,439. Expert testimony provided that the asset appreciation rate
was lower than the rate of return for low-risk government-backed investments. Id. at 1340. At the
decedent's death on June 8, 1991, the five-year Treasury rate was approximately eight percent. See
id. at 1337; See U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ domestic-finance/ debt-management/ interest-rate/ yieldhistorical- 1991 .shtml (last visited
September 19, 2008). This amount has been used as the market appreciation rate. Given the expert
testimony that the asset appreciation rate was lower than the market appreciation rate, Figure 8
assumes an asset appreciation rate of six percent. See Estate of Dunn, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1340.
No turn-over rate or projected holding period was determined. Figure 8 assumes a five-year
projected holding period.
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Figure 9 (Estate of Jelke) 316
ra = 23%; rn = 13%; n = 5

(values in hundreds)
Asset Sale

Cash. Liq.

In-Kind Liq.

Asset Hold

CV
AB In

1,886,358
(411,305)

1,886,358
(411,305)

1,886,358
(411,305)

1,886,358
(411,305)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

1,475,053
(516.269)

1,475,053
(516,269)

1,475,053
(516.269)

1,370,089
(1,370,089)

1,370,089
(1,370,089)

1,370,089
(1,370,089)

1,886,358
(1,748,881)

Net CV In
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net CV Out
FV
AB In

--

0

0

--

--

(0)

(0)

--

1,370,089

1,370,089

3,642,306

3,642,306

7,177,775

(1,370,089)

....

--

--

9,882,460
(411,305)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

2,272,217
(795,276)

Net FVIn
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

2,847,030
(1,370,089)

(1,370,089)

(1,370,089)

6,567,556
(1,748,881)

1,476,941
(221,541)

2,272,217
(340,833)

5,807,686
(871,153)

4,818,675
(722,801)

Net FV Out

2,625,489

3,301,473

6,306,622

5,844,755

o°

9,471,155
(3,314,904)

Two points about these figures are worth noting. First, the Fifth
Circuit in Estate of Jameson properly considered the difference between
the asset appreciation rate and the market appreciation rate. Even
though the corporation had a large built-in gain, the market appreciation

316. The values in Figure 9 are calculated using the factual findings in Estate of Jelke v.
Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397 (2005). In Estate of Jelke, the current value of the assets was
$188,635,833. Id. at 1399. These assets had a built-in tax liability of $51,626,884. Id. Assuming a
thirty-fve percent corporate tax rate, the built-in gain would have been $147,505,383, and the
corporation's basis would have been $41,130,450. The asset appreciation rate was approximately
twenty-three percent. See id. The market appreciation rate was thirteen percent. See id. at 1402.
The Tax Court used a sixteen-year turn-over rate, meaning that all of the corporation's current
assets would be sold over sixteen years. Id. Rather than calculating sixteen blocks to account for
each year's turn-over, see infra text § IV.D, Figure 9 uses a projected holding period of eight years
as the mean of the projected holding periods.
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rate was significantly higher than the asset appreciation rate, resulting in
corporate liquidation being the superior option. However, had the rates
been equal, a HWB would have held the assets to avoid immediate
recognition of the built-in gain, and the dollar-for-dollar discount would
have been
inappropriate.3 17 The same would have been true in Estate of
3 18

Dunn.

Second, despite Estate of Dunn and Estate of Jelke problematically
holding that the dollar-for-dollar discount should be applied as a matter
of law, the values demonstrate the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit
actually held correctly. Given the amount of the built-in gain, a HWB of
the corporations in Estate of Dunn and Estate of Jelke would have
liquidated because the benefit of avoiding two-tiered taxation on future
appreciation would have outweighed the detriment of immediately
recognizing the built-in gain. Therefore, the dollar-for-dollar discount
was appropriate, as gain would have been recognized immediately. The
fact that the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit reached the right
result for the wrong reason arguably supports the idea that judicial
efficiency should prevail. However, cases where liquidation is preferred
may very well be anomalies.3 19 Courts should instead implement a
modified liquidation test as a more accurate yet efficient method of
adjudication.
C. Calculatingthe Built-in Gain Discount
The IRS has argued and the Tax Court has seemingly agreed that
the built-in gain discount should be calculated by treating the potential
tax as a liability under the net asset value approach.32 ° Under this
method, the first step is to calculate as of the valuation date the built-in
gain in the underlying assets and the tax that would be imposed on that
gain if the gain were recognized immediately. Based upon the projected
holding period, the liability is discounted to present value and is

317. As evident from Figure 7, cash liquidation where the market appreciation rate equals
twenty percent would yield net future cash value of $8,273,727. If the asset appreciation rate also
would have been twenty percent, the net future cash value of an asset hold would have been
$8,328,682. Therefore, the HWB would have held the assets in the corporation if the rates had been
equal.
318. If the asset appreciation rate had also been eight percent, the net future cash value of an
asset hold would have been $7,068,345, which is superior to $7,038.415.
319. See supra note 312.
320. See Estate of Jelke, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1404; Estate of Dunn, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1345;
Estate of Jameson v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383, 1396-97 (5th Cir. 2001).; but see infra note
323 and accompanying text.
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subtracted from the value of the assets to yield a net asset value. This
liability approach is problematic because it ignores the type of economic
analysis the HWB would likely undertake. Simply freezing the built-in
gain on the valuation date and discounting it to present value overlooks
the impact the built-in gain will have on the HWB's net future cash
value. The built-in gain and the related tax liability are not static;
instead, as the value of the underlying assets increases, so does the builtin gain. In response to this challenge, the IRS has argued that
considering future appreciation permits a discount for future taxes.32'
At first glance, the IRS's argument seems to have some merit;
however, a closer look reveals the flaws. Because the HWB seeks to
maximize economic advantage, the treatment of the tax on the built-in
gain as a liability frames the question in an unrealistic light. The HIWB's
concern is not calculating actual future tax liability. Rather, the HWB
seeks to maximize net future cash value. The relevant question is to
what extent the built-in gain impedes the realization of future wealth.
Thus, the HWB must determine what amount of money invested in an
identical corporation without a built-in gain would yield the same net
future cash value as the purchase of stock in the corporation with the
built-in gain. For this same reason, while future appreciation is a
relevant consideration, using future appreciation to determine future gain
recognition and discounting such gain to present
value fails to provide
322
discount.
appropriate
the
of
measure
accurate
an
Further, the built-in gain discount should not be viewed as a
liability in computing net asset value. Instead, the discount is better
understood as a subsidiary component of a lack of marketability
discount. Stock in a corporation with built-in gains is worth less because
it is unmarketable on account of the fact that the HWB could pay less for
stock in an identical corporation without a built-in gain and still receive
the same net future cash value. A few decisions have recognized
such.323
To properly calculate the discount, the HWB will select whichever
of the four options yields the highest net future cash value. Using the
superior option, the HWB can calculate the amount of the discount by

321. See Estate of Jelke, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1403-04. The Tax Court agreed. Id. at 1404.
322. Such a calculation may fail to yield an accurate result as it does not account for the
HWB's incentive to liquidate or to hold. Further, it simply discounts the future liability rather than
considering net future cash value. The decision in Estate ofLitchfield v. Commissioner seems to
overlook these considerations. 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079 (2009).
323. See Estate of Davis v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 530, 553-54 (1998); Gallun v. Comm'r, 33
T.C.M. 1316, 1321 (1974).
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comparing the net future cash value of the superior option to the net
future cash value of a hypothetical option in which an identical
corporation has no built-in gain. The discount is the excess of the net
future cash value of the hypothetical option over the net future cash
value of the superior option, represented as a percentage of net future
cash value of the hypothetical option.324 Figure 3B demonstrates this
point.
Given the values in Figure 3A, it was clear the HWB had an
incentive to retain the assets in the corporation. By holding for five
years assets with current value of $200,000 and a basis of $5,000, the
HWB would have a net future cash value of $202,119. However, if
$200,000 in assets had a $200,000 basis so that the corporation had no
built-in gain, then the HWB would have received $267,461. The
difference in the net future cash values is the direct result of the built-in
gain. Because of the built-in gain, the HWB receives 24.43 percent less
than the HWB would have received investing the same amount of
money in an identical corporation without a built-in gain. Instead, if the
HWB were to invest 24.43 percent less, $151,140, in an identical
corporation without a built-in gain, the HWB would receive the same net
future cash value as the HWB would have received had the HWB
invested in the actual corporation. The marketability of the actual
corporation is impaired by 24.43 percent on account of the built-in gain,
as the HWB would pay only $151,140 to receive net future cash value of
$202,119.

324. This computation can again be performed algebraically.

The relevant formulae are as

follows:

Generally:
d=1-

NetFVOutwith BIG
NetFVOutwithout BIG

Where an asset sale, cash liquidation, or in-kind liquidation is preferred:

d =-

CV(1 - Rco) + RcoABIn
CV(1 -Rco) + RcoCV

Where an asset hold is preferred:

d =1

CV(1 - Rco)(1 + ra)"n+ RcoABIn
CV(l - Rco)(1 + ra) + RcoCV
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Figure 3B
ra = 10%; rm = 10%; n = 5
Hold
w/ BIG

Hold
w/o BIG

DCV
w/o BIG

200,000
(5,000)

200,000
(200,000)

151,139
(151,139)

200,000
(151,139)

200,000
(200,000)

151,139
(151,139)

322,102
(5,000)

322,102
(200,000)

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

317,102
(110,986)

122,102
(42,736)

322,102
(5,000)
317,102
(110,986)

Net FVIn
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

211,116
(151,139)

279,366
(200,000)
79,366
(11,905)

211,116
(151,139)

Net FV Out

202,119

267,461

202,119

CV
AB In
GainIn
Tax (Rco)
Net CVIn
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net CV Out
FV
AB In

59,977
(8,997)

59,977
(8,997)

d = 24.43%
DCV= 151,139

Only where the relevant values indicate that liquidation would yield
the highest net future cash value would the dollar-for-dollar discount
result. Figure 4B shows the application of this analysis to the values
from Figure 4A. Figure 4B confirms that the dollar-for-dollar discount
is appropriate as $52,500, the amount of tax that would be payable upon
liquidation, divided by $200,000, the current value of the assets, also
equals 26.25 percent.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol24/iss1/5

50

Bowman: Built-in Gain Discounts for Transfer Tax Valuation: A Resolution
2009]

BUILT-IN GAIN DISCOUNTS FOR TRANSFER TAX VALUATION

Figure 4B
ra = 10%; rm = 10%; n = 5
Liquidation
w/BIG

Liquidation
w/o BIG

DCV
w/o BIG

CV
AB In
GainIn
Tax (Rco)

200,000
(50,000)
150,000
(52,500)

200,000
(200,000)
0
(0)

147,500
(147,500)

Net CV In
AB Out

147,500
(147,500)

200,000
(200,000)
0
(0)

147,500
(147,500)

Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

0
(0)

0
(0)

Net CV Out

147,500

200,000

147,500

FV
AB In

237,550

322,102

237,550

Net FVIn
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)

(147,500)
90,050
(13,508)

(200,000)
122,102
(18,315)

(147,500)
90,050
(13,508)

Net FV Out

224,042

303,787

224,042

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

d = 26.25%
DCV= 147,500

D. FurtherConsiderations
The above analysis is by no means perfect, nor does it purport to be
'32 5
applicable to every possible scenario that "life in all its fullness
might supply. Instead, a modified liquidation test mirrors the essence of
transfer tax valuation-it seeks to provide a close approximation of an

325. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (acknowledging that
the complexity of economic transactions may require a case-by-case analysis to determine
appropriate tax treatment).
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economic reality that can rarely be reduced to exactitude.32 6
Accordingly, some further considerations are worth noting.
Most importantly, for the above calculations to function properly
the asset appreciation rate and the projected holding period must be the
same for all assets analyzed in each equation. Accordingly, implicit in
the above analysis is the assumption that there is either a single asset in
the corporation or that multiple assets in the corporation bear the same
asset appreciation rate and projected holding period. As these figures
demonstrate how the modified liquidation test could be applied to a
relatively simple set of facts, it remains necessary to account for the
possibility of more complicated factual scenarios and the challenges that
such scenarios present for determining the discount, including the proper
computation of the discount and the implications for corporate tax
treatment.
More complicated factual scenarios might arise in two situations.
First, it is possible that the corporation will hold several of the same
asset, for example, multiple shares of the same marketable security. The
HWB may choose to segregate the shares into multiple blocks and select
a different projected holding period for each block. Second, it is almost
certain that the corporation will hold multiple assets. If the corporation
holds multiple assets, it is likely that the assets will have different asset
appreciation rates and different projected holding periods.
In such scenarios, the application of the modified liquidation test
becomes more complicated, though the fundamental principles and
assumptions remain valid. To accurately compute the built-in gain
discount, it is necessary to segregate the blocks or assets into groups
with the same projected holding period and same asset appreciation rate.
Then, using the methodology applied above, the discount for each block
or asset can be computed. Finally, a built-in gain discount for the entire
corporation can be computed by using the current value of each block or
asset to calculate the weighted average of the respective discounts.
The computation of the built-in gain discount where multiple
projected holding periods or multiple asset appreciation rates are
involved may raise doubts about the fundamental assumption that
distributions from the corporation receive sale or exchange treatment.
However, this remains an accurate assumption. The problem posed by
the presence of multiple projected holding periods or multiple asset

326. See Estate of Thalheimer v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 877, 910 (1974) (stating that as
"valuation is not an exact science, no formula can be devised that will be generally applicable to all
cases").
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appreciation rates is the possibility that the HWB would have the
incentive to liquidate some blocks or assets, either in cash or in kind, and
to hold other blocks or assets. For example, if the corporation owned
two blocks of the same asset described in Figure 2E and had a projected
holding period of five years for one block and of eleven years for the
other block, it may seem the HWB would hold the five-year block and
distribute the eleven-year block.32 7 Similarly, if the corporation owned
the assets described in Figure 2E and the assets described in Figure 6A,
it may seem the HWB would hold the Figure 2E assets and distribute the
cash sale proceeds of the Figure 6A assets.
At first glance, this would appear to mean that sale or exchange
treatment would be unavailable for the distributions. The above analysis
assumed that any distribution from the corporation to the HWB will be a
liquidating distribution, meaning that either the HWB liquidates all the
HWB's stock or the corporation liquidates all its underlying assets. If
the HWB liquidates all the HWB's stock, the distribution is one in
complete redemption of the HWB's interest, resulting in sale or
exchange treatment under § 302(b)(3). If the liquidation is in complete
liquidation of the corporation, the distribution receives sale or exchange
treatment under § 331. This treatment is always proper where there is a
single asset. It is also appropriate where there are multiple assets that the
HWB plans to hold for the same projected holding period. In these
circumstances, there would be only one distribution, either immediately
upon purchase or at the end of the projected holding period, and either §
302(b)(3) or § 331 would apply.
However, where the HWB has an incentive to distribute some
blocks or assets and to hold other blocks or assets, then neither §
302(b)(3) nor § 331 would apply. 32 8 Nonetheless, the assumption that
the distributions will receive sale or exchange treatment remains valid.
The consequence of failing to receive sale or exchange treatment would
be such that it would alter the incentive to make multiple distributions.
The figures suggest that the HWB will either hold entirely or liquidate
entirely, thereby ensuring sale or exchange treatment under either §
302(b)(3) or § 331.

327. Compare supra Figure 2E, with supra Figure 5A.
328. Because the distribution would not be in complete redemption of the HWB's stock, I.R.C.
§ 302(b)(3) would not apply. Because the corporation would not be in complete liquidation, I.R.C.
§ 331 would not apply. There may be some possibility that the distributions would receive sale or
exchange treatment under I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) or (b)(4), but such a possibility would be highly fact
dependent and impossible to generalize.
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First, the incentives may shift if the corporation owns two blocks of
the same asset and projects two different holding periods. For example
if the corporation owns a Figure 2E block and a Figure 5A block, the
HWB would no longer have the incentive to liquidate the Figure 5A
block; instead, the HWB would hold both blocks. This is because if the
HWB were to immediately distribute the Figure 5A block, the
distribution would be subject to § 301.329 If the corporation has
sufficient earnings and profits, which is likely the case, the net future
cash value of the Figure 5A block would be represented as in Figure 5B.
In contrast to the above calculations, which demonstrated the tax
consequences with a return of capital, Figure 5B shows the result where
the initial distribution is entirely subject to tax as a dividend.
Thus, if dividend treatment applies to the first distribution, the
Figure 5A block, then the HWB will have a net future cash value of
$292,215 for the Figure 5A block. Sale or exchange treatment will
apply to the Figure 2E block,33 ° which will have a net future cash value
of $203,795." 3' Accordingly, distributing the Figure 5A block and
holding the Figure 2E block will result in a total net future cash value of
$496,010. 312 In such a scenario, holding both blocks or liquidating both
blocks would be superior. By holding both, the HWB would have a net
future cash value of $547,514 .3" By liquidating both, the HWB would
have a net future cash value of $546,560. 334 Therefore, the HWB will
hold both assets to avoid dividend treatment. The total built-in gain
discount would be the weighted average of the discounts for each block.

329. I.R.C. § 301. See supra text § V.A.
330. The distribution would be made in complete redemption of the HWB's stock and would
therefore be subject to I.R.C. § 302(b)(3).
331. See supra Figure 2E.
332. Calculated as $203,795, the net future cash value of the Figure 2E block under an asset
hold option if sale or exchange treatment applies, plus $292,215, the net future cash value of the
Figure 5A block if dividend treatment applies. See supra Figure 2E. See infra Figure 5B.
333. Calculated as $203,795, the net future cash value of the Figure 2E block under an asset
hold option if sale or exchange treatment applies, plus $343,719, the net future cash value of the
Figure 5A block under an asset hold option if sale or exchange treatment applies. See supra Figure
2E. See supra Figure 5A.
334. Calculated as $202,778, the net future cash value of the Figure 2E block under a
liquidation option if sale or exchange treatment applies, plus $343,782, the net future cash value of
the Figure 5A block under a liquidation option if sale or exchange treatment applies. See supra
Figure 2E. See supra Figure 5A.
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Figure 5B
ra = 10%; rm = 10%; n = 5

Figure 6B
ra =10%; rm=15%; n = 5

Cash Dist.
CV
AB In

Tax (Rco)

200,000
(10,000)
190,000
(66,500)

Net CVIn

133,500

Tax (Rind)

147,500
22,125

Net CV Out

20,025
113,475

Net CVIn
Tax (Rind)
Net C V Out

125,375

FV

323.757

FV
AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)

252.174

CV
AB In
Gain In

AB In
Gain In
Tax (Rco)
Net FV In
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net FV Out

(113,475)
210,282
(31,542)
292,215

Gain In
Tax (Rco)

Net FV In
AB Out
Gain Out
Tax (Rind)
Net FV Out

200,000
(50,000)
150,000
(52,500)

(125,375)
126,799
(19,020)
233,154

A similar result may arise if the corporation owns the Figure 2E
assets and the Figure 6A assets, as the HWB will no longer have the
incentive to hold the Figure 2E assets. If the HWB were to immediately
distribute the cash sale proceeds of the Figure 6A assets, the distribution
would be subject to § 301. If the corporation has sufficient earnings and
profits, the net future cash value of the Figure 6A assets would be
represented by Figure 6B, which shows the result where the initial
distribution is entirely subject to tax as a dividend.
Thus, if dividend treatment applies to the first distribution, the
Figure 6A assets, then the HWB will have a net future cash value of
$233,154 for the Figure 6A assets. Sale or exchange treatment will
apply to the Figure 2E assets,335 which will have a net future cash value
of $203,795 .336
Accordingly, holding the Figure 2E assets and
distributing the Figure 6A assets will result in a total net future cash
335. The distribution would be made in complete redemption of the HWB's stock and would
therefore be subject to I.R.C. § 302(b)(3).
336. See supra Figure 2E.
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value of $436,949. 337 In such a scenario, liquidating both assets would
be superior. By liquidating both, the HWB would have a net future cash
value of $477,077.338 Therefore, the HWB will choose to liquidate both
assets to avoid dividend treatment. A dollar-for-dollar discount would
be appropriate.
Two final considerations are worth noting. First, the above analysis
assumes that where liquidation is most advantageous, such liquidation
will occur. This assumption is made for analytical purposes only, and it
does not necessarily reflect what would necessarily occur. In some
circumstances, the HWB will control insufficient voting power to
effectuate liquidation of corporate assets or the redemption of stock.
The HWB, despite being able to calculate the most advantageous course
of action, will be unable to realize the maximum possible wealth.
Nonetheless, such scenarios ought to have no impact on the calculation
of the built-in gain discount. In these circumstances, it is not the built-in
gain that impedes the realization of future wealth. Instead, it is the
HWB's inability to control the corporation that renders the interest worth
less. Transfer tax valuation jurisprudence already has a mechanism to
account for such circumstances-the lack of control discount. 339 Thus,
to factor into the built-in gain discount the HWB's minority control
would be inaccurate and redundant.
Second, a possible argument exists that the entire premise of a
modified liquidation test is flawed in that rather than using the net asset
value approach to account for the built-in gain, a market approach would
be more appropriate. Certainly where the market approach is available,
it is an easier methodology to apply. Therefore, there may be
circumstances where closed-end mutual funds, whose value would
already reflect a discount for built-in tax liability, might be used as
comparable property under a market approach. However, where the
differences between the comparable property and the entity being valued
are too great to be remedied by adjustment, use of the market approach

337. Calculated as $203,795, the net future cash value of the Figure 2E assets under an asset
hold option if sale or exchange treatment applies, plus $233,154, the net future cash value of the
Figure 6A assets if dividend treatment applies. See supra Figure 2E. See supra Figure 6B.
338. Calculated as $202,778, the net future cash value of the Figure 2E assets under a
liquidation option if sale or exchange treatment applies, plus $274,299, the net future cash value of
the Figure 6A assets under a cash liquidation option if sale or exchange treatment applies. See
supra Figure 2E. See supra Figure 6A.
339. Supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. The Tax Court has apparently overlooked this
point. See Estate of Dunn v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, 1344-45 (2000), rev'd, 301 F.3d 339
(5th Cir. 2002).
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would be inappropriate. 340 Courts that have considered using closed-end
mutual funds as comparable property have found the disparities between
the funds and the entities being valued too significant, and they have
declined the use of the market approach. 34' Future courts would likely
do the same.
IV. CONCLUSION

Resolution of the debate over the built-in gain discount will have
significant implications for transfer taxation. Despite the Fifth Circuit
and the Eleventh Circuit offering bright-line tests permitting the dollarfor-dollar discount, proper calculation of the discount is far from settled.
Particularly in light of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to offer a
resolution, adoption of an accurate yet reasonably straightforward test
will be critical to ensure fair adjudication of the issue. A modified
liquidation test provides such a resolution. By embracing the logical and
historical significance of the prospective liquidation test, a modified
liquidation test addresses the impact of the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine. Moreover, by reducing complex computations to
usable formulae, it offers a method for courts to produce accurate
decisions without excessively expending judicial resources.
But whether a modified liquidation test may ever make its way into
jurisprudence on the built-in gain discount is questionable, as taxpayers
and the IRS are unlikely to yield from their current arguments.
Taxpayers will continue to assert entitlement to the taxpayer-friendly
dollar-for-dollar discount; the IRS will seek to minimize the discount by
freezing the built-in gain on the valuation date and discounting its
recognition to present value. Thus, courts may be left to a .'life of toil
and effort' to determine for themselves the just and accurate decision.

340. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
341. See Estate of Jephson v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 297, 304 (1986) (citing Estate of Piper v.
Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979)); Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Obermer v.
United States, 238 F. Supp. 29, 34-35 (D. Haw. 1964).
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